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The public forum doctrine protects a right of access—“First 
Amendment easements”—to streets and parks and other traditional 
places for public expression.1  It is well known that the doctrine was 
articulated by the Supreme Court in a series of cases in the 1930s and 
1940s.2  Lesser known are the historical circumstances that surrounded 
 
* Ph.D., History, University of California Berkeley; J.D., Stanford Law School. 
 1. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, SUP. CT. REV 1, 
13 (1965).   
 2. On the history of the public forum doctrine, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOMAINS:  DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT, ch. 6; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, 
The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment 
Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984); Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana:  Speech In Public 
Places, SUP. CT. REV. 233 (1974); Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine:  In 
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its creation.  In a new, modern world where the mass media dominated 
public discourse—where the “soap box . . . [had ceded] to the radio and 
political pamphlet[s] to the monopoly newspaper[s]”3—critics expressed 
deep anxieties that mass communications had undermined the possibility 
of widespread participation in politics, public life, and democratic 
“public discussion.”4   The public forum doctrine was one response to 
this concern. 
This article describes the development of the public forum doctrine 
in the context of a larger story about the nation’s efforts in this period to 
come to terms with its first modern crisis of communication.  This crisis 
was precipitated by dawning public awareness of the fundamental 
contradiction of mass communications: that the mass media had become 
indispensable to public discussion yet at the same time deeply threatened 
it.  Without the mass media, a culturally diverse and geographically 
dispersed public could not communicate across social and spatial 
boundaries.  At the same time, the mass media undermined the public’s 
ability to communicate meaningfully.  The street-corner preacher and 
soapbox orator could not compete with the mass media for a public 
audience.  Poor and disfavored groups could not use the media to 
express their views, and media owners skewed the news to suit their 
political interests. 
This crisis of communication became a crisis in freedom of speech.  
In the 1930s, the Supreme Court identified the paramount values of the 
First Amendment as freedom of expression and freedom of public 
discussion.5  Government noninterference with private expression, the 
Court assumed, would lead to robust and open public discussion of 
political affairs, the essence of democratic self-governance.6  Yet the rise 
of vast media empires in the 1930s demonstrated how an unregulated 
press could distort public opinion and quash the expression of non-media 
speakers.  By World War II, the Court and the public had acknowledged 
the tensions between freedom of expression and the ideal of public 
discussion in the mass media age.7  This was the paradox of the modern 
First Amendment, and its recognition marked a turning point.  It 
 
Defense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV 79 (1992); Richard T. Pfohl, Hague v. CIO and the Roots 
of the Public Forum Doctrine:  Translating the Limits of Powers into Individual Rights, 28 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 533 (1993).  
 3. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1641, 1643 (1967).  
 4. Id. at 1641-47.  
 5. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 3.  
 6. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 3. 
 7. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 3. 
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spawned a contentious national debate on the meaning of freedom of 
speech under the new system of modern mass communications—radio, 
motion pictures, and mass publishing. 
One byproduct of this dialogue was an affirmative theory of the 
First Amendment as a state obligation to provide the public with the 
means to carry out public discussion.8  Advocates of this view argued 
that freedom of speech had a necessary economic component.9  When 
privately-owned media companies controlled the means of 
communication, economic inequalities were communicative inequalities.  
The government must compel privately-owned media to facilitate the 
speech of non-media speakers and itself provide alternative means of 
communication to those unable to access the media. 
The centerpiece of this vision was the concept of the democratic 
public forum.  I use the term “public forum” to refer to any venue, 
privately or publicly owned, that is devoted to public discussion—the 
exchange of diverse and competing views on matters of public 
concern—and to that end, facilitates the speech of groups and 
individuals who would not otherwise have access to communications 
media.  The public forum is both a site for public debate and a means of 
communication for the less privileged.  In the 1930s and 1940s, 
intellectuals and activists sought to enlist the state in the creation of 
“public forums” on the radio, in print journalism, and in public space. 
This article examines this public forum movement and its enduring 
impact on the free speech doctrine and social thought.  The period 
between 1930 to the end of World War II saw the emergence of what 
remain contested questions:  the extent to which freedom of speech 
protects access to the means of communication, and the role of the state 
in correcting the inequalities in the ability to communicate produced by 
the mass media.10  I want to complicate the existing historiography of 
freedom of speech by embedding the development of the doctrine within 
the social history of mass communications.  The foundational free 
speech principles articulated in this period were not only the result of a 
national conversation about rights, but a parallel dialogue about the 
 
 8. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake:  Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 
IOWA. L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimating Myth, 
1984 DUKE L. J., 1, 8-10 (1984). 
 9. See, e.g., sources in note 8, supra.  
 10. See, e.g., infra note 11. 
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social impact of mass communications and their transformation of the 
meaning of democratic speech.11 
This article also illuminates the historical origins of the “market 
dysfunction” argument that has dominated recent First Amendment 
debates—that the ideal of democratic self-governance cannot exist 
alongside “monopoly control of the media, [and] access limitations 
suffered by disfavored or impoverished groups”12 and that the state must 
“counteract the skew of public debate attributable to the market and thus 
preserve the essential conditions of democracy.”13  This critique did not 
originate in the latter twentieth century but was developed in the World 
War II era.14  The public and the courts in this period were not in the 
thrall of a “romantic” vision of freedom of speech, as they have been 
accused—gripped by a belief that “the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is freely 
accessible”15—nor entirely insensitive to the problem of average citizens 
getting ideas before a public audience.16  Rather, they were conscious of 
the perils posed by concentrated ownership of mass communications and 
the fact that the mass communication industries hindered if not 
foreclosed public access to the means of effective public 
communication. 
 
 11. In this era, the Supreme Court adopted the modern civil libertarian interpretation of 
freedom of speech—that because of its intimate connection to the democratic process, freedom of 
speech occupied a “preferred position” in the scheme of constitutional liberties that warranted 
heightened judicial solicitude.  As Harry Kalven, Jr. has written, this was the period when “speech 
starts to win.”  See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
AMERICA, 167 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).  See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of 
Age:  The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299 (1996); 
STEVEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA:  A HISTORY (2008); 
Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise:  Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the 
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1 (2000); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1699 (1991).  
 12. Ingber, supra note 8, at 5.  
 13. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987).  
 14. For the work of latter twentieth century First Amendment scholars, see Barron, supra note 
3; Fiss, supra note 13; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
(1993).  
 15. This was the critique leveled by Barron in his pathbreaking 1967 article Access to the 
Press.  According to Barron, “[o]ur constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of 
free expression.”  “While we protect expression once it has come to the fore, our law is indifferent 
to creating opportunities for expression.”  Barron called for “legal intervention if novel and 
unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum—unorthodox points of view which have no claim on 
broadcast time and newsspace as a matter of right are in [a] poor position to compete with those 
aired as a matter of grace.”  Barron, supra note 3, at 1641; see discussion infra Part IV.  On the 
enduring impact of Barron’s work, see articles published in the symposium in the George 
Washington Law Review titled Access to the Press:  1967 to 2007 and Beyond:  A Symposium 
Honoring Jerome A. Barron’s Path-Breaking Article, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (2008).  
 16. See Barron, supra note 3, at 1652.  
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Part I of this article establishes the background for the movement to 
create public forums for speech by examining responses to the advent of 
the mass media in the first decades of the twentieth century.  I frame the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in this period as part of 
a national debate about democracy and communication in the new mass-
mediated environment.  The story of the evolution of modern free speech 
doctrine is inextricably intertwined with the social experience of mass 
communications. 
Part II looks at efforts to resolve the contradictions of mass 
communications through an affirmative theory of freedom of speech, as 
it came to be articulated in a nationwide effort to turn broadcasting into a 
public forum.  A broadcast reform movement in the 1930s pressured the 
Federal Communications Commission to use its licensing authority to 
compel station owners to present competing viewpoints on public affairs 
in the interest of “public discussion.”  The constitutional rationale for 
this was the “scarcity doctrine”—because of the limited number of radio 
frequencies, the government could, consistent with the First 
Amendment, supervise broadcast content in order to facilitate the 
dissemination of diverse views to the public and the inclusion of all 
social groups in public discourse.  Despite the acceptance of the scarcity 
rationale by the courts and the Commission, radio never became the 
public forum that the reformers desired. 
Part III looks at a similar campaign to turn newspapers into public 
forums through right of access laws and balanced content requirements 
enforced by the state.  This effort foundered on the historical tradition 
against state interference with editorial control over press content and 
prior restraints on publishing.  By 1945, the Supreme Court had 
concluded, and media reform advocates conceded, that the only 
mechanisms to achieve viewpoint diversity in print journalism, 
consistent with the First Amendment, were antitrust enforcement to 
diversify ownership and social pressure on publishers to fulfill their 
public obligation to present a wide range of views.17 
Part IV looks at the Court’s acknowledgement of the link between 
economic and communicative inequalities, and the tension between the 
ideals of freedom of expression and public discussion, in its 
development of the public forum doctrine.  The public forum cases 
interpreted the First Amendment to guarantee access to certain kinds of 
public property for expressive purposes.  This was essential, the Court 
 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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suggested, because of mass media’s domination of public discourse.18  
Because average citizens could not use the mass media for 
communication, and because the First Amendment did not permit a right 
of access to privately owned communication facilities, freedom of 
speech protects a right to reach a public audience in the streets, 
commons, and parks.19 
I.  THE PARADOX OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 
In the early twentieth century, the introduction of new media 
technologies into American society altered virtually every dimension of 
public and private life.  The nation’s love-hate relationship with the mass 
media began.  Critics recognized that the mass media had become 
essential for communication in the vast and diverse nation that the 
United States had become.20  Yet at the same time, the media 
undermined the average citizen’s ability to participate in politics, 
community, and public life.  This contradiction lies at the core of the 
history of mass communications and modern freedom of speech.  It 
preoccupied the people who lived through this social transformation.  
The American people were awash in a sea of communications, as 
historian Warren Susman discusses, yet feared that the mass media had 
robbed them of their ability to communicate effectively.21  Their outlook 
on the future of the media age was marked by “significant hopes” and 
“significant doubts.”22 
A. The Modern Communications Revolution 
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first 
quarter of the twentieth century, the United States experienced a mass 
communications revolution.  Old media technologies, such as newspaper 
printing, became cheaper and more efficient, and new communications 
technologies were developed and disseminated to a growing urban 
populace.  The mass-market newspaper industry expanded dramatically 
beginning in the late nineteenth century.23  Antebellum “penny papers” 
 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See, e.g., WARREN I. SUSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1973). 
 21. See generally id. at ch. 14 & 252-70. 
 22. Id. at 260. 
 23. PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA:  POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS 252 (2004). 
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became powerful, advertising-driven metropolitan dailies and chains, 
proffering so-called “yellow journalism” to audiences of millions.  By 
1900, there were 94 papers per 100 households; in 1927, the total 
circulation of daily newspapers was over 42 million, or nearly 2 per 
household.24  By 1920, 90% of Americans were estimated to be 
newspaper readers.25  During the early twentieth century, motion 
pictures became the premiere form of public entertainment, and radio 
entered American homes. 
Criticisms of the media, and its effects on social life, were bitter 
and voluminous.26  Social elites claimed that publishers corrupted public 
morals by pandering to the vulgar tastes of the working classes with 
sensationalism, scandal, and lies.27  Progressive reformers also launched 
a political critique of the media: journalism posed a threat to democracy 
because publishing had become a big business, and publishers distorted 
the news to serve the interests of capital.28  Mass media had become—
dangerously—the public’s sole outlook on reality.  As the critic Walter 
Lippmann had written, “the quack, the charlatan, the jingo and the 
terrorist . . . flourish . . . where the audience is deprived of independent 
access to information.”29  And yet it was widely recognized that the 
media were indispensable to the workings of modern society.  As 
journalist Will Irwin observed in 1911, “the complex organism of 
modern society could no more move without [newspapers] than a man 
could move without filaments and ganglia.”30 
The response to these concerns by the Progressive movement, 
which sought to ameliorate social ills through social welfare legislation, 
was to call for regulation of the press.  Between the 1890s and the 1920s, 
states and municipalities passed laws that—among reforms—required 
journalists to sign all articles or editorials, criminally punished the 
printing, publishing, and selling of publications devoted to “criminal 
news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories 
 
 24. For circulation figures, see ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER IN AMERICA:  
THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIAL INSTRUMENT 726, 729, 731 (1947). 
 25. Id. at 726, 731. 
 26. See, e.g., Francis Fenton, The Influence of Newspaper Presentations Upon the Growth of 
Crime and Other Anti-Social Activity, AM. J. SOC., Nov. 1910, at 342. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  The press “‘habitually and continually and as a matter of business practice every form 
of mendacity known to man, from the suppression of the truth and the suggestion of the false to the 
lie direct.’” Id. at 344. 
 29. WALTER LIPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS 54-55 (1919). 
 30. Will Irwin, The American Newspaper, COLLIER’S, Jan.-June 1911,  reprinted in KILLING 
THE MESSENGER 126 (Tom Goldstein, ed. 1989). 
7
Barbas: Creating the Public Forum
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  2:25 PM 
816 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:809 
of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime,”31 and that imposed civil and 
criminal liability for media invasions of privacy.32  In 1915, one writer 
noted a “distinct trend towards regulation of the American press.”33  
“[E]very evidence that the legislator who has been looking for new 
fields of business to regulate has now turned his attention to the press.”34 
Claiming “freedom of the press,” publishers challenged these laws, 
often unsuccessfully.35  Before the 1930s, courts tended to interpret the 
right to freedom of speech as subservient to the greater social good, as 
defined by the social elite.36  Although prior restraints were proscribed, 
subsequent punishment of speech that had a “bad tendency,” that 
allegedly threatened public safety or morals, was seen a legitimate 
exercise of the state’s police powers.37  The bad tendency rule was 
applied to the press.  Criminal libel, obscenity and contempt convictions 
involving the press were upheld against First Amendment challenge in 
federal courts,  including the U.S. Supreme Court.38  As Justice White 
had written for the majority in the 1918 case Toledo Newspapers v. 
United States, upholding the conviction of a newspaper editor for 
contempt of court for publishing information during a trial that was 
“reasonably likely” to impair the administration of justice, “the 
safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is 
the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests 
and that freedom therefore does not and cannot be held to include the 
 
 31. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 522-23 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 32. See LINDA LAWSON, TRUTH IN PUBLISHING:  FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PRESS’S 
BUSINESS PRACTICES 1880-1920, 65-67 (1993). 
 33. Regulating the Press, THE NATION, Apr. 1, 1915, at 348. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., State v. McKee, 49 L.R.A. 542 (1900); In re Banks, 56 Kan. 242 (1895); State v. 
Van Wye, 136 Mo. 227 (1896); State v. Pioneer Press, 100 Minn. 173 (1907). 
 36. The entire entry on freedom of the press in a 1901 encyclopedia stated that it “consists in 
the right to publish, with impunity, the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, whether it 
respects governments or individuals.”  It did not protect publications that “from their blasphemy, 
obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice . . . 
may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.”  FELDMAN, 
supra note 11, at 234.  
 37. State laws were analyzed under state constitutional provisions that paralleled the First 
Amendment.  It was not until 1925, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1925), that the 
First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, was made binding on states.  For the authoritative 
account of the history of free speech before the 1930s, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS 
FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997).  
 38. In the 1907 case Patterson v. Colorado, the Supreme Court upheld a finding of criminal 
contempt, noting that the First Amendment did not limit subsequent punishment of speech that 
impeded the proper administration of justice—only prior restraints.  205 U.S. 454 (1907).  See Fox 
v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).  
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right virtually to destroy such institutions.”39  Liberty of the press, courts 
were fond of saying, was not to be used as a license for its abuse.40 
B. The Optimistic View: Freedom of Expression and Public 
Discussion 
A civil libertarian movement in the World War I era challenged 
these content-based restrictions on speech and press.  In the process, it 
reframed the First Amendment in terms of the social interest in “public 
discussion,” the basis of the democratic process.  The ideal of public 
discussion was used to justify state noninterference with private speech 
and the workings of the press.  The assumption was that when citizens 
and editors were allowed to speak freely, without the threat of official 
punishment, public debate would flourish, and through it, the people 
would govern themselves. 
The Progressive movement had supported the government 
crackdown against dissenters during World War I, claiming the interests 
of society as a whole trumped individual liberties.41  Yet Progressive 
intellectuals at the vanguard of an emergent civil libertarian 
movement—philosopher John Dewey, Harvard law professor Zechariah 
Chafee, and Louis Brandeis, among the most notable—challenged the 
Espionage and Sedition Acts and criticized the suppression of speech 
that did not pose a clear and present danger to public safety.42  Prewar 
movements for freedom of speech had characterized it as an individual 
liberty akin to freedom of contract.  This was anathema to the 
Progressives’ deep hatred of the Lochner43 decision and their advocacy 
of social welfare legislation and extensive legislative control over 
economic affairs.44  The Progressive civil libertarians resolved this 
dilemma by resting the basis of free speech on the social interest in free 
speech, which they described as public participation in democratic 
public discussion.45 
In his 1920 book Freedom of Speech, Chafee, who would remain a 
leading public intellectual and free speech theorist for over thirty years, 
also described a “search for truth” rationale that saw freedom of speech 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 419-20.  
 41. MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH:  THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL 
LIBERTARIANISM, 76 (1991). 
 42. See generally id. 
 43. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 44. See Graber, supra note 41, at ch. 2 & 3. 
 45. Id.   
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as necessary for the “social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the 
country may . . .  adopt the wisest course of action.”46  Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes would use this reasoning in his famous 1919 dissent in 
Abrams v. United States.47  Only when individuals are able to express 
themselves freely without state interference, he wrote, could there be 
“free trade in ideas,” with the best ones winning in the competition.48  
Yet it was the public discussion model, which linked free speech to 
democratic deliberation, which became the leading justification for the 
expansion of free expression rights by the Supreme Court in the 1930s.  
As Justice Brandeis wrote famously in his concurrence in Whitney v. 
California, the individual’s liberty to speak was not only valuable in its 
own right, but as a means of fostering the public discussion necessary 
for democratic self-governance.49  Participation in public discussion was 
the duty of every citizen in a democratic society.50 
In a string of cases, even before the “1937 turn” and the Roosevelt 
appointees, majorities on the Court used the concept of “freedom of 
discussion” to invalidate the convictions of religious minorities, 
socialists, communists, and union activists under state laws restricting 
various forms of public speech that did not pose a clear and present 
danger to public safety.51  “The maintenance of the opportunity for free 
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the 
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means . . . 
is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system,” the majority 
noted in Stromberg v. California, from 1931.52  Because free expression 
is “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every . . . form of 
freedom,”53 freedom of speech occupied a “preferred position” in the 
scheme of constitutional liberties that warranted heightened judicial 
solicitude.54  State action that infringed free expression and “free 
discussion” by regulating speech on the basis of content was now 
presumed unconstitutional. 
 
 46. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 36 (1920). 
 47. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).  As Holmes wrote, “[t]he best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Id. at 630. 
 48. Id. at 630. 
 49. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927).  
 50. Id. at 375.   
 51. See e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).   
 52. Id. at 369.  
 53. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).  
 54. On the “preferred position” theory on the Court in this era, see White, supra note 11, at 
330-32.  
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/6
11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  2:25 PM 
2011] CREATING THE PUBLIC FORUM 819 
The threat of punishment chilled expression; when it was removed, 
the Court assumed, the natural processes of social ordering would lead to 
vigorous debate on public affairs.55  State noninterference with 
expression would encourage the participation of all social groups, 
particularly minority groups, in the self-governing process.56  In the 
Depression and New Deal, with the rise of organized labor, a population 
one-third of recent immigrant origin, and President Roosevelt’s efforts to 
court a broad and inclusive electorate, “freedom of discussion” 
symbolized the Court’s embrace of an emerging model of pluralist 
democracy—the notion of a diverse people who shared a cultural 
commitment to govern themselves through democratic processes 
characterized by fair bargaining.57 
This connection between free expression and “freedom of 
discussion” presumes certain speech conditions.  It assumes that, short of 
obstacles posed by the state, all willing speakers have the means to 
participate in public discourse and communicate their ideas to a public 
audience.  By the 1930s, however, these conditions no longer existed.  
When the First Amendment was framed, communication was relatively 
cheap—starting a paper required comparatively little financial outlay 
and town meetings were widely attended.58  But it did not fit the new 
world of mass communications, where speech opportunities were scarce, 
costly, and unequally distributed.59  This realization, as we will see in 
Part IV, would come slowly to the Court.60 
C. The Discussion Theory of the Press 
The Court’s view of the press under the discussion model was 
optimistic:  a free press leads to free discussion.  In its envisioned 
“‘world of debate about public affairs,’”61 the press played a central role.  
In fact, the Court suggested, under modern conditions, public discourse 
and the processes of political deliberation could not take place without 
the press.62 
 
 55. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 11.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 332-33.   
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. On the disjuncture between the “Holmes” and “Brandeis” models of free speech, see 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 28. 
 61. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 629 (1990). 
 62. See generally id. 
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During the first third of the twentieth century, the United States had 
transformed from a rural society of discrete “island communities” to a 
mass society knit together by national politics and industry, the 
administrative state, and mass communication and transportation 
systems.63  Although the culture was in many ways nationalizing and 
homogenizing, immigration was diversifying the social fabric and the 
population was disseminating across the continent.  Sociologists began 
to recognize that communication in a heterogeneous, far-flung society 
could not occur in the absence of common experiences and frames of 
reference.64  In modern mass society, in the absence of the directly 
shared activities, homogeneous backgrounds, and geographic proximity 
that bound together residents of the small community, the only vehicle 
for disseminating these systems of collective representation was the 
mass media.  Sociologist Robert Park believed the news media could 
create a “general understanding and a community of interest among all 
parties sufficient to make discussion possible.”65  For Park, the purpose 
of the news was not only to represent and inform but to stimulate inquiry 
and dialogue—to “‘make people talk.’”66  Public opinion, the political 
will of the public and the basis for collective action, was a product of 
discourse; it emerged “from the discussions of individuals attempting to 
formulate and rationalize their individual interpretations of the news,” he 
wrote.67 
In its cases dealing with the institutional press in the 1930s and 
early 1940s, the Court, adopting a similar view, intimated that the most 
important function of the news media is to generate public discourse 
through the dissemination of common information on “matters of public 
concern,” which it defined in 1941 as “all issues about which 
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to 
cope with the exigencies of their period.”68  As Justice Murphy observed 
in 1943, newspapers and radio, which surpassed traditional forms of 
social authority, including the school and the “pulpit,” had “assume[d] a 
 
 63. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER:  1877-1920 (David Donald ed., 1967). 
 64. Robert E. Park, News and the Power of the Press, AM. J. SOC. vol. 47, no. 1, 1, 6 (1941). 
As Robert Post observes, “Communication requires not merely common information, but also 
commonly accepted standards of meaning and evaluation.”  Persons who do not share a minimum 
set of such standards simply cannot understand one another.  Post, supra note 61, at 636.   
 65. See Park, supra note 64. 
 66. Robert E. Park, News as a Form of Knowledge:  A Chapter in the Sociology of 
Knowledge, AM. J. SOC. vol. 45, no. 5, 669, 679 (1940).  The essence of the news was that it would 
cause in the listener “a desire to repeat it to someone.”  Id. at 677.  
 67. Park, supra note 64, at 2.  
 68. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1941).  
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/6
11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  2:25 PM 
2011] CREATING THE PUBLIC FORUM 821 
function and responsibility of . . . wide reach and importance in the life 
of the nation” and become major media of “public discussion.”69  In this 
model of the press, the mass media allowed diverse audiences to “think 
about the same things at the same time and thus share a version of social 
reality,” and created a “public community,” one that perceived itself as 
unified by “shared . . . interests, common experience . . . , and a deep 
sense of interdependence,” to use the words of journalism historian 
David Paul Nord.70 
We can see this view of the press as an essential catalyst to public 
discussion in several decisions in this period extending the principle of 
“freedom of discussion” to justify state noninterference with 
journalism.71  In Near v. Minnesota, the first case in which the Court 
applied heightened scrutiny to a law burdening freedom of press, the 
majority invalidated a state nuisance law that prohibited “malicious, 
scandalous, and defamatory” publications.72  The law had been passed 
by the state legislature and enacted for specific use against a salacious 
and anti-Semitic Minneapolis “scandal sheet” that had viciously 
criticized public officials.73  The law was aimed at stopping the 
excitement of scandal and material that “disturb[ed] the peace of the 
community.”74  The majority characterized the law as an 
unconstitutional prior restraint75 and the essence of censorship.76  In the 
 
 69. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 232 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  
 70. DAVID PAUL NORD, COMMUNITIES OF JOURNALISM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
NEWSPAPERS AND THEIR READERS 111, 128 (2001).  
 71. There has been much debate about whether the Court in this period implicitly granted 
independent significance to the press clause.  See David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 
UCLA L. REV. 77 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press A 
Redundancy:  What does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 639 (1975); Margaret A. 
Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. CT. L. REV. 225 
(1978); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429 (2002); C. Edwin Baker, 
The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 
(2007). 
 72. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931).  Near and Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 
U.S. 233 (1936), have typically been described in terms of a Fourth Estate model of the press, which 
sees the constitutional function of the press as a fourth institution outside government that serves as 
an additional check on the three official branches by monitoring and alerting the public to 
governmental misdeeds.  But this model, as it is described in Near and Grosjean, is also a discourse 
model.  By focusing attention on official wrongdoing, the press creates among readers a concern 
with democratic governance, producing discussion leading to political action.  On the watchdog or 
Fourth Estate model, see Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 
735 (1977); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983). 
 73. Near, 283 U.S. at 701-04. 
 74. Id. at 709. 
 75. Id. at 723. 
 76. Id. at 713. 
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state legislature’s view of the press, newspapers disrupted communities 
and public order by publishing controversial news.77  In the Court’s 
emerging model, a press that excited scandal by focusing attention on 
current events generated democratically valuable public discussion.78  A 
law that prohibited the excitement of controversy and a clash of opinion 
was “‘equivalent to a prohibition of discussions.’”79 
The crucial relationship of the press to the shared civic 
consciousness necessary for public discussion was again invoked in the 
1941 case Bridges v. California, in which a majority led by Justice 
Black, applying the clear and present danger test to contempt actions, 
invalidated the conviction of a prominent metropolitan paper, the Los 
Angeles Times-Mirror, for contempt of court for criticism of ongoing 
judicial proceedings.80  The anti-labor newspaper had published an 
editorial that called on the state court to deny parole for two union 
members convicted of property destruction during a labor dispute.81  
Disputes involving labor were among the most controversial issues of 
the day, Black noted.82  If reported on in the press, they would become 
major topics of public discussion.  The strict rule on contempt removed 
the current controversies that commanded the most public interest from 
the “arena of public discussion”83 at “the precise time when public 
interest in the matters discussed would naturally be at [their] height.84  
. . . when the audience would be most receptive.”85  “An endless series 
of moratoria on public discussion, even if each were very short, could 
hardly be dismissed as an insignificant abridgment of freedom of 
expression.”86  By bringing public attention to “controversies,” Black 
suggested, the press provided the public with the stimuli for 
conversation.87  By focusing interest on labor disputes, trials, “issues and 
officials,” the press, particularly in anonymous and fragmented urban 
 
 77. See generally id. 
 78. See generally id. 
 79. Near, 283 U.S. at 722.  In dicta in Grosjean v. American Press, in which the Court struck 
down a Louisiana law that imposed a license tax on advertising for the highest circulation papers in 
the state, Justice Sutherland noted the essential role of the press in focusing readers’ attention on 
“common interests,” allowing the public to “unite[ ] for [its] . . .  common good” as “members of an 
organized society.” 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936). 
 80. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).  
 81. Id. at 271-72.  
 82. Id. at 268-69.  
 83. Id. at 269.  
 84. Id. at 268.  
 85. Id. at 269.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 268-69.  
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environments such as Los Angeles, created among readers the necessary 
sense of common identity and interest for public discussion. 
There is a certain logic to this view of the modern press as 
necessary to public discussion, but its idealism should be obvious.  It 
assumes that editors and publishers are driven by civic concerns rather 
than self-interested political objectives.  It assumes that the public has 
the ability to respond to what it sees in the papers.  These presumptions 
were out of step with the attacks on the media in this era.  Many critics 
on the left in the 1930s described the mass media as incompatible with 
the ideal of democratic public discussion.88 
D. The Pessimistic View:  Mass Media and the Demise of Discussion 
As should be clear by now, American society in this period had a 
conflicted, even schizophrenic, relationship to mass communications.  
As we have seen, social scientists recognized the potential of the media 
to facilitate communication in a heterogeneous, dispersed mass society.89  
As Hadley Cantril and Gordon Allport noted in a 1935 study of 
broadcasting, radio exposed the public to new and diverse streams of 
thought while leveling social distinctions and creating a “community of 
interest,” making it a “powerful agent of democracy.”90  If the popular 
culture of the time is any indication, strains of this same optimism were 
shared by the culture at large.91  But the hopes were often overshadowed 
by a bleak and pessimistic view that became even darker and more 
cynical as the 1930s progressed.  Alarmed by political developments in 
Europe, the rise of the American advertising industry, and what some 
described as Roosevelt’s home-grown dictatorship, the public worried 
increasingly about what was described as the “propaganda menace.”92  
According to critics, the mass media negated the possibility of a 
genuinely participatory democracy and brought about the conditions for 
 
 88. See discussion infra Part I.D.  
 89. On the origins of the academic field of communication studies in this period, see DANIEL 
J. CZITROM, MEDIA AND THE AMERICAN MIND:  FROM MORSE TO MCLUHAN (1982); DAN 
SCHILLER, THEORIZING COMMUNICATION:  A HISTORY (1996); MASS COMMUNICATION AND 
AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT:  KEY TEXTS, 1919-1968 (John Durham Peters & Peter Simonson 
eds., 2004) [hereinafter KEY TEXTS]. 
 90. Hadley Cantril & Gordon Allport, The Influence of Radio upon Mental and Social Life, 
from The Psychology of Radio (1935), reprinted in KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 111.  
 91. On the public’s fascination with issues and themes revolving around communication, see 
SUSMAN, supra note 20. 
 92. KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 81. 
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fascism—the subversion of the popular mind by political and corporate 
interests.93 
Media criticism came to constitute its own literary genre and 
cottage industry in the 1930s.  It is difficult to summarize the many, 
diverse critiques of mass communications that filled the pages of books 
and academic journals, but they might be grouped under two broad 
themes.  One was a structural critique:  concentrated, private ownership 
of newspapers and radio stations produced a dangerous ideological 
homogeneity that distorted and biased the news.  Another line of 
criticism focused on the media’s impact on interpersonal relationships.  
Audiences tuned out from public affairs, avoided face-to-face interaction 
with their peers, and instead immersed themselves in silent, solitary 
consumption of the media’s distorted, fantastic unreality.  The upshot 
was the demise of community, public engagement in social life, and the 
democratic process.  Through their monopoly over the means of 
communication and the wellsprings of public thought, the mass media 
would create a public that was mute and passive, one that ceded control 
over political governance and public morals to the self-interested owners 
and operators of the communication industries. 
1.  The Evils of Concentration 
The Atlantic Monthly held a contest for readers on the subject of 
press freedom, and the winning entry is revealing:  the media were no 
longer “trustees of constitutional liberty,” the prizewinner wrote, but 
“the beneficiaries of a special privilege tending to be concentrated in 
fewer and fewer hands.”94  The 1930s saw the rise of the one-paper 
town, network radio, and the multimedia chain.  High entry costs to 
publishing led to a declining number of daily newspapers in the face of 
the highest circulations on record.95  From 1930 to 1944, while daily 
newspaper circulation rose from 39 to 46 million, the number of dailies 
dropped more than 10%.96  By 1941, of the about 900 commercial radio 
stations that had been licensed, 730 of them were gathered into one of 
the four major networks.97 
Never before had newspapers been so wholly dominated by 
concentrated business interests.  The pro-business bias of the major 
 
 93. See, e.g., KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 81-82. 
 94. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Hutchins Commission, The Press and the Responsibility 
Concept of Journalism, JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS, no. 49, May 1977, at 18. 
 95. See generally MORRIS L. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1946).  
 96. Id. at 78.  
 97. Id. at 127.  
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/6
11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  2:25 PM 
2011] CREATING THE PUBLIC FORUM 825 
papers allegedly appeared not only in editorial content but also in news 
reporting.  Publishers, who saw the New Deal as a threat to their 
financial interests, attacked President Roosevelt and organized labor.  
Robert McCormick's Chicago Tribune declared that “‘a New Deal vote 
is an invitation to murder’ and depicted FDR alongside Mussolini, 
Stalin, and Hitler as the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.”98  Waving 
the banner of freedom of the press, publishers fought against the 
application of new federal social welfare and labor laws to the press.  
Among their assaults on the New Deal, the major publishing 
associations brought unsuccessful First Amendment challenges in court 
against the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.99  Public resentment mounted.  Hearst, Pulitzer, and the other major 
publishers were attacked as “lords of the press” who wielded power for 
their own ends and propagated their own opinions, especially in matters 
of politics and economics.100  It was widely believed that the press was 
the single greatest influence over public opinion, and that the public 
mind had fallen under the sway of the “despotism” of publishers who 
dealt in “half-truths or whole lies.”101 
According to left-wing critics, the major publishers had effectively 
created an airtight system of ideological uniformity.  With the publishing 
industry largely concentrated on the right, there was no “clash of 
opinion” between newspapers, depriving the public of the opportunity to 
hear competing views.  Nor were there discussions of diverse 
perspectives on public affairs within any given newspaper or broadcast.  
The partial view of society presented in the media distorted public 
opinion in favor of the status quo.102  Because newspapers and broadcast 
stations were under no duty to sell or offer space to the public, minority 
voices never appeared.  “There were and are . . . groups in their 
communities who never can get their aspirations, their points of view, 
 
 98. Stephen Bates, Realigning Journalism with Democracy:  The Hutchins Commission, Its 
Times, and Ours, available at http://www.annenberg.northwestern.edu/pubs/hutchins.   
 99. See Blanchard, supra note 71, at 228 n.12.   
 100. See generally, O.W. Riegel, Propaganda and the Press, ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF 
POL.AND SOC. SCI., May 1935, at 201. 
 101. George Fort Milton, The Press and Public Opinion:  The Function of The Newspaper, 
PUBLIC OPINION Q., Jan 1938, at 55-56. 
 102. As news of religious and ethnic persecution in Europe reached American audiences in the 
latter 1930s, and as domestic labor conflict reached new heights, liberal social critics focused 
increasingly on intergroup relations and the political and cultural dimensions of the minority 
experience.  Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 
YALE L. J. 1287, 1298-99 (1982). 
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printed in the columns of these newspapers,” complained Oswald 
Garrison Villard, former editor of the Nation, in 1938.103 
When the First Amendment was adopted, presses were cheap, and 
“anybody with anything to say had comparatively little difficulty in 
getting it published,” one critic wrote.104  If a publisher wanted to use his 
paper as his own personal soapbox, there was little danger to the public, 
because opponents could start another publication,105 or “various 
opinions might encounter each other in face-to-face [public] 
meetings.”106  This open and accessible system of public debate had 
become a vestige of the past.  The media were the gatekeepers to the 
public mind, the engineers of public opinion.  The average citizen’s 
ability to address a public audience was entirely at the sufferance of the 
media owners. 
2.  Alienation and Disengagement 
While the concentration of the media in the hands of the economic 
elite thwarted democracy by prohibiting diverse social groups from 
accessing the means of public communication, the media also impeded 
democratic participation by distorting the human relationships that made 
meaningful communication possible.  This critique of the media had 
flourished in the 1920s and persisted in the academic thought and 
popular culture of the 1930s.107  Although John Dewey believed that the 
power of the media could be harnessed to reinvigorate social 
relationships and create the “Great Community,” mass 
communications—“relatively impersonal and mechanical”—could also 
erode the “depth of close and direct . . . attachment” between people.108  
As sociologist Ernest Burgess commented in 1928, when people 
depended on the media, rather than their communities, as a source of 
information and companionship, the possibility of intimate and 
sympathetic interpersonal communication was destroyed.109  In Dewey’s 
 
 103. Oswald Garrison Villard, Freedom of the Press, PUBLIC OPINION Q., Jan. 1938, at 58.  
 104. THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS:  A 
GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION:  NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES, 
MAGAIZINES, AND BOOKS 14 (1947) [hereinafter THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS]. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 15. 
 107. See KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 15.  
 108. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS, 98, 143, 213 (1927).  
 109. E.W. Burgess, Communications, AM. J. OF SOC., vol. 34, no. 1 (Jul. 1928).  
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words, mass communications “disintegrated the small communities of 
former times.”110 
Media critiques were filled with accounts of the subversion or 
destruction of traditional community rituals by the solitary, superficial 
practices of media consumption.111  In their famous 1929 sociological 
study of Muncie, Indiana, published as Middletown, Robert and Helen 
Lynd had observed how public oratory, once a major form of public 
entertainment, had been replaced by newspaper and magazine reading.112  
Unlike the public lecturing that took place at summer picnics and fairs, 
with their opportunities for public interaction and conviviality, the media 
so avidly consumed by Muncie residents were produced entirely outside 
the community.113  Rather than discuss ideas with their neighbors, 
people turned on the radio.  “For every individual who listens to a street 
corner address, there are tens of thousands who listen to a radio speech,” 
one critic lamented.114  The media had diverted the attention of the 
public away from important concerns that affected the local community 
to big-city ideas and consumer values.  Novelist Sherwood Anderson, in 
his work Winesburg, Ohio, noting that mass media had “worked a 
tremendous change in the lives and the habits of thought of our people of 
Mid-America,” observed that even the simple farmer no longer spoke his 
own words but had become a mouthpiece for the press.115  He parroted 
what he had read in the papers, “talking as glibly and senselessly as the 
best city man.”116 
The mass media often bore the brunt of a more generalized 
criticism of modernity, urbanization, and mass culture.117  The media 
were both agents and symbols of the demise of traditional ways of life.  
Because of the radio, one writer lamented, “Town meetings are for the 
most part regarded as relics of the horse and buggy days.”118  Critics 
linked the rise of mass communications to the demise of face to face 
meetings, oral discussion, and the public forum—the intimate settings 
 
 110. DEWEY, supra note 108, at 127.  
 111. See, e.g., KEY TEXTS, supra note 89.  
 112. Id. at 60.  
 113. Robert S. Lynd & Helen Merrell Lynd, From Middletown:  A Study in Contemporary 
American Culture (1929), reprinted in KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 60. 
 114. ACLU Brief at *5, Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, Nos. 554, 555 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1943), 
1943 WL 71849.  
 115. SUSMAN, supra note 20, at 260.  
 116. Sherwood Anderson, WINESBURG, OHIO (1919), quoted in Susman, supra note 20, at 260.  
 117. The national media—newsmagazines, radio broadcasts, syndicated columns — 
encouraged communities to “orient themselves outward,” as did chain stores, national brands, and 
the centralization of government power under the New Deal. Bates, supra note 98.   
 118. ACLU Brief, supra note 114, at *5. 
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and relationships that were seen as necessary for democratic 
participation to flourish.119 
3.  The Critical Need for Public Forums 
Mass media’s perceived monopoly over popular consciousness and 
the means of communication led to a movement in the 1930s to 
democratize communication.  This “public forum movement,” as I call 
it—a diverse and diffuse body of lawyers, activists, and intellectuals—
sought to counter the media’s distorting effects on public discussion. 
They did so by encouraging alternative, non-media forms of 
communication, and seeking legal means to compel the mass media to 
facilitate the expression of minority speakers, particularly those that 
challenged the interests of big business.  These critics proposed that the 
mass media be legally required to serve as “public forums,” venues 
where speakers representing all social groups could express their ideas 
and competing perspectives on public affairs could be discussed and 
debated.120  Because media owners, on their own accord, would never 
subsidize the speech of groups hostile to their political interests—or 
offensive to their audiences and advertisers—the only way these forums 
could be created was through government involvement.  The state must 
impose requirements that the media cover public issues from all points 
of view and grant access to minority speakers, even if this meant 
denying other speakers’ requests for airtime or newspaper space. 
Because Progressive civil libertarians in this period did not frame 
freedom of speech solely in terms of autonomy interests, as in later 
years, but as a positive right to participate in self-government, the state 
was not yet “an enemy.”121  Many associated the protection of civil 
liberties with economic and social justice, which could be secured 
through social welfare legislation.  By creating the material conditions 
for the effective exercise of speech rights, the government could 
affirmatively advance the goals of the First Amendment.  As historian 
Laura Weinrib writes, the 1920s and 1930s was a transitional period in 
the history of civil liberties in which the right to free speech was not 
entirely negative but was “nonetheless countermajoritarian.”122 
 
 119. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., 2 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 
(1947).   
 120. See examples throughout article.  
 121. Laura M. Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private Rights:  Free Speech, Liberal 
Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 187, 201 (2009). 
 122. Id.  
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In his influential treatise Government and Mass Communications, 
Chafee argued that the First Amendment permitted the government to 
expend resources on communication facilities for private speech.123  He 
advocated state-created “physical facilities for communication” in the 
form of “Hyde Parks,” auditoriums, and meeting halls.124  But the state 
could not constitutionally dictate the expressive uses of privately owned 
media, Chafee insisted.125  Yet other liberal intellectuals and activists 
argued that the First Amendment allowed the state to compel privately-
owned communication facilities to provide minimum access to the 
public and to present the views of underrepresented groups.126  This 
affirmative view of freedom of speech was developed and used in 
campaigns to turn the radio and newspapers into public forums.127 
II.  RADIO AS A PUBLIC FORUM 
A. The Broadcast Reform Movement 
Broadcasting was in many ways the most appropriate “place” to 
create a public forum in the 1930s.  Most American families owned a 
radio and broadcasting had become the focal point of public attention, a 
major source of news and entertainment, and a medium for national 
politics.128  When broadcasting was introduced in the 1920s, it was 
predicted to have great democratic and educational potential.129  Its wide 
dissemination, the minimum financial outlay it demanded from listeners, 
and the fact that it was transmitted directly into the home made it the 
“most powerful instrument of social education the world has ever 
seen.”130  Radio gave the public easy access to information about public 
affairs.  Many envisioned that the radio would integrate rural Americans, 
the elderly, immigrants—society’s outsiders—into the mainstream social 
fabric.131  When marginalized groups turned on the radio, they 
 
 123. See generally CHAFEE, supra note 119.  
 124. Id. at 479.  
 125. See GRABER, supra note 41, at 162-63.  
 126. See generally GRABER, supra note 41.  
 127. Id.  
 128. On the early history of radio see STARR, supra note 23, at ch. 10 &11.   
 129. See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND 
DEMOCRACY:  THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 3-11 (1993).  
 130. Id. at 86.  
 131. See generally id.; and George V. Denny, Jr., Radio Builds Democracy, J. OF EDUC. SOC., 
vol. 14, no. 6, Feb. 1941.  
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participated in a shared cultural ritual and took their place in a national 
community of listeners.132 
By the mid-1930s, however, it was widely recognized that radio 
had not lived up to its democratic potential.  Radio had become almost 
entirely commercial, and ad agencies wrote and controlled major 
broadcast programs.  The critiques of partisanship, concentrated 
ownership, and viewpoint homogeneity applied equally to radio as print 
journalism.  The networks dominated the airwaves, and during the 
1930s, newspaper-radio cross ownership became increasingly common.  
By 1940, out of 897 licensed stations, 298 were associated with 
newspapers.133  Perhaps even more than print journalism, radio 
broadcasting was said to exert a totalizing force over public discourse. 
The major difference between broadcast and print journalism was 
broadcasting’s tie to the state.  Congress, in the Radio Act of 1927, 
asserted that the government owns the airwaves and may license them to 
licensees to hold in trust for the benefit of the people.134  Broadcast 
stations were privately owned and had the right to exclude others from 
their segment of the airwaves, but their right to operate was granted and 
conferred by the government.  In granting licenses to broadcast stations, 
the Federal Radio Commission, the administrative agency created by the 
Act, was supposed to consider a variety of factors, including the 
financial and technical qualification of the applicant, the applicant’s 
character, and whether it met the “public interest” standard.135  In 
exchange for the free and exclusive right to use part of the radio 
frequency spectrum, licensees were obliged to air programming in the 
“public interest”—that would serve the “public convenience, interests, or 
necessity.”136  Congress left it to the Commission to define the standard.  
In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act, the successor to the 
Radio Act, and delegated regulatory power to the Federal 
Communications Commission, the FRC’s replacement.137 
 
 132. Denny, supra note 131.  
 133. The Guild Reporter, ACLU PAPERS (Mar. 15, 1942), microformed on American Civil 
Liberties Union Archives:  The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE 
JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.).  
 134. Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1163.  On the history of the “public trustee” doctrine, see Anthony E. Varona, Out of 
Thin Air:  Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis to Redeem American Broadcasting 
Regulation, 39 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 149 (2005) 154-57.  
 137. 47 U.S.C. § 301. 
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A section of the Federal Communications Act explicitly prohibited 
government censorship over radio content.138  It stated that nothing 
“shall be understood . . . to give the Commission the power of 
censorship over the radio communications” and that “no regulation or 
condition shall be promulgated . . . by the Commission which shall 
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication.”139  And yet the public interest licensing standard 
implied FCC authority to exert content-based discrimination.  Although 
the FCC never clearly defined the standard, early on, it equated the 
“public interest” with commercial broadcasting.  In a 1929 order, the 
Radio Commission determined that the stations that best served the 
public interest were those that served the “entire listening public within 
the listening area of the station.”140  This meant “general public service” 
stations—commercial stations—rather than what it described as 
“propaganda” or political stations.141  Following the implementation of 
this order, license applications from noncommercial broadcasters were 
routinely denied.142 
In the early 1930s, civic, religious and labor groups mobilized in 
opposition to the FRC’s strictly commercial interpretation of the public 
interest standard.  The most vocal advocates included the Chicago 
Federation of Labor, the Pacific-Western Broadcasting Federation, a 
nonpartisan coalition supported by a variety of civic and religious 
groups, and the American Civil Liberties Union.143  Their goal was a 
policy requiring the set-aside of a certain portion of the spectrum for 
noncommercial broadcasting.144  They believed that radio must serve as 
a public forum for communication, one accessible to speakers of all 
backgrounds and interests, and that this could never be achieved under a 
purely commercial system.145  They rallied behind the Wagner Hatfield 
Amendment to Communications Act, which had proposed a set aside of 
25% of all radio facilities for the use of nonprofit organizations.146  In 
the face of opposition from the networks and the American Bar 
 
 138. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1934). 
 139. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1934).  See also Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1172-73.  
 140. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 27. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 26. 
 143. Id. at 63. 
 144. See generally id. at ch. 4. 
 145. MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at ch. 4. 
 146. Id. at 75. 
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Association, the proposal failed.147  American broadcasting became a 
system dominated by nationwide chains supported by commercial 
advertising.148  The radio reform efforts intensified. 
B. The ACLU and the Radio Public Forum 
Of all the interest groups in the broadcast reform movement, the 
ACLU, the focus of this section, was most cognizant of the 
constitutional dimensions of radio regulation and worked actively to 
define a principle of freedom of speech in the broadcasting context.149  
The civil libertarian organization had been created in the wake of the 
post World War I Red Scare in the interests of securing the speech rights 
of society’s least popular and most marginalized groups—organized 
labor, socialists, anarchists, racial minorities, even the Ku Klux Klan.  Its 
founding and affiliated members included the many of the most 
esteemed Progressive lawyers and legal academics of the time.150  At the 
head of the ACLU’s broadcast reform effort was Morris Ernst, a New 
York civil liberties lawyer best known for his fight against censorship.  
Within the ACLU, Ernst was known as a liberal individualist who 
defined freedom of speech in negative terms.151  In the radio context, 
however, Ernst urged state involvement in broadcast content as a means 
to achieve the necessary material conditions for public discussion and 
the participation of minority groups in public debate.152 
In the 1930s, Ernst and the ACLU’s Radio Committee153 feared two 
different kinds of censorship.  The first was government censorship—the 
 
 147. Many of the top members of the ABA Standing Committee on Radio had connections to 
the networks.  See id. at 131. 
 148. Id. at 129. 
 149. Yet as communications historian Louise Benjamin notes, “freedom of speech” was 
mobilized by virtually every interest group with a stake in radio, from government regulators to 
broadcast stations to political opposition groups.  Every group devised its own constitutional or 
quasi-constitutional rationale to support its interests.  See LOUISE M. BENJAMIN, FREEDOM OF THE 
AIR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN BROADCASTING TO 1935 (2001).  
 150. Including Roger Baldwin, a leader of the American Union Against Militarism, which 
opposed American involvement in World War I, the radical feminist and pacifist Crystal Eastman, 
and Walter Nelles, a former corporate attorney in New York.  Zechariah Chafee had worked closely 
with the ACLU.  See David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing 
Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 100-01 (1992). 
 151. Laura M. Weinrib, Lawyers, Libertines, and The Reinvention of Free Speech, 1920-1933 
(2009), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu 
lawwebsiteacademicscolloquialegal_history/documents/documents/ecmpro063101.pdf. 
 152. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 81. 
 153. The Radio Committee was formed in 1933.  The ACLU also had a committee called the 
National Council on Freedom from Censorship, formed in 1931, which was also active in radio 
censorship issues.  See id. at 82; BENJAMIN, supra note 149, at 192.   
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FCC’s denial or revocation of a broadcast license to politically 
unpopular or controversial broadcasters.  In 1931, the ACLU got 
involved in the case of pastor Bob Shuler, who used broadcasts on his 
station to make defamatory attacks on public officials, Catholics, and 
Jews.154  The FRC denied his application for license renewal, and with 
the help of the ACLU, Shuler appealed the decision on free speech 
grounds.  The D.C. Circuit affirmed the FRC’s decision, stating that the 
First Amendment did not prohibit the Commission, in the public’s 
interest, from denying licenses to those who used the radio for 
defamation.155  The Shuler case, the first case in which a federal court 
dealt directly with the constitutional issue of freedom of speech over the 
air, affirmed the authority of the FRC to consider past program 
performance at license renewal time.156  During the 1930s, the ACLU 
continued to devote much of its attention to contesting license denials of 
stations that broadcast politically controversial views.157 
Yet at the same time, the ACLU Radio Committee encouraged the 
FCC to make content-based licensing decisions in an effort to eradicate 
“private censorship” of the airwaves by station owners.158  The ACLU 
had conducted a series of studies in which it found numerous cases of 
radio stations refusing time to unpopular political groups or forcing them 
off the air.159  In 1935, the Radio Committee described censorship at the 
stations by the managers, rather than government censorship, as the 
primary threat to free speech on the radio.160  The Committee advocated, 
either by statute or regulation, the creation of a “public interest” standard 
that would require stations to devote time to controversial issues and to 
present alternative viewpoints on public affairs.161  “We have 
concluded—not without wistful glances in other directions, however—to 
abandon the notion that censorship means exclusively government 
censorship,” the Committee wrote in a 1935 policy statement.162  “We 
 
 154. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 851; Charley Orbison, “Fighting Bob” Shuler:  Early Radio Crusader, 21 J. BROAD. 
459 (1977); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 
(1987). 
 157. See generally MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at ch. 4. 
 158. Id. at ch. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Report on Radio Censorship, ACLU PAPERS (Apr. 24, 1935), microformed on American 
Civil Liberties Union Archives:  The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, 
GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.). 
 161. See Draft of Letter to the Members of the Federal Communications Commission (Mar. 27, 
1939) (on file with author) [hereinafter Draft of Letter]. 
 162. Report on Radio Censorship, supra note 160. 
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have concluded that so long as Congress has power under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate communication, it must and will so do according to 
some standard, and that, by definition, such regulation implies the power 
to deal with program content.”163 
This effort was a response, in large part, to the networks’ refusal to 
sell time to organized labor.164  In the 1930s, labor unions, one of the 
ACLU’s major constituencies, had hoped to use radio as an organizing 
tool, for publicity, and to create a unified working-class culture.165  The 
networks justified refusing selling time to labor by claiming that labor 
messages were almost always “controversial issues.”166  The National 
Association of Broadcasters, representing 500 member stations, had 
written a code of self-regulation in which it urged station owners not to 
sell radio time for the presentation of “controversial issues,” since if 
stations sold time to political groups for the discussion of such issues, 
only groups that could afford to pay would be represented on the air, 
skewing public opinion.167  The ACLU believed that this was a pretext 
for animus against labor and attacked the NAB code as censorship in its 
worst form.168  No labor organization could buy time on the networks, 
although “business under the cover of sponsored programs can get its 
propaganda across freely.”169  The ACLU complained to the FCC, but 
under the Radio Act, content discrimination by station management 
could not be used as the basis for denying license renewal.170  When they 
did sell time to labor, most stations demanded that the speakers provide 
advance scripts.  When speakers veered from their scripts, the stations 
turned their microphones off.171 
The ACLU subsequently embarked on an effort to secure the 
passage of equal-time and equal-access laws that it claimed would turn 
radio broadcasts into “open forums reaching millions” and eliminate the 
 
 163. Id.   
 164. See Memorandum for Labor Unions Indicating the Necessity for Supporting Bills S.2755, 
S.2756, S.2757 & H.R. 3038, H.R. 3038, H.R. 3039 (Dec. 1937) [hereinafter Memorandum for 
Labor Unions]. 
 165. See ELIZABETH FONES-WOLF, WAVES OF OPPOSITION:  LABOR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
DEMOCRATIC RADIO (2006). 
 166. Excerpts from the NAB Code Manual (1939), reprinted in LLEWELLYN WHITE, THE 
AMERICAN RADIO:  A REPORT ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 
THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 249 (1947) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN RADIO]. 
 167. NAB 1939 Standards of Practice (1939), reprinted in THE AMERICAN RADIO, supra note 
166, at 242-43. 
 168. FONES-WOLF, supra note 165, at 91. 
 169. See Memorandum for Labor Unions, supra note 164. 
 170.  See generally Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162. 
 171. Memorandum for Labor Unions, supra note 164. 
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“unfair practice of broadcasting one-sided propaganda.”172  In 1932, 
Ernst and the ACLU’s National Council on Freedom from Censorship 
had been involved in the drafting of an ultimately unsuccessful 
amendment to the Communications Act that would have required 
stations to air speakers representing both sides of important public 
issues.173  In 1935, the Radio Committee drafted a bill for “Unrestricted 
Discussion of Public Issues,” subsequently introduced by California 
Representative Byron Scott.174  It attempted to enlist seventy-five 
educational, church, liberal, and labor organizations—what it described 
as a coalition of “the outs”—behind the proposed legislation.175  The bill 
would amend the Communications Act to require each licensee to set 
aside periods on desirable times of the day and evening for “uncensored 
discussion on a nonprofit basis” for “social, political and economic 
problems, and for educational purposes.”176  The bill required that 
anytime a station aired a controversial issue, it must “give a hearing to at 
least two sides of every issue presented.”177  Licensees would be relieved 
of responsibility to the FCC and the courts for any defamatory 
statements on those broadcasts.178  The ACLU claimed the bill would 
extend free speech to radio through the “establishment of radio open 
forums on every station in the country.”179 
The Scott bill failed to receive hearings at the committee level. 
Even the traditional liberal allies of the ACLU feared the broadcast 
lobby and did not want to be connected with the legislation.180  The 
proposal did, however, push station owners to more frequent use of the 
“public forum” radio format.  “Public forum” programs, which became 
common during the mid-1930s, were often touted as surrogates for the 
“Colonial ‘town hall’ meeting.”181  The NAB described the radio public 
forums as programs “wherein the clash of opinions and ideas are 
broadcast in a radio-forum debate so that the greatest number of citizens 
may hear the issues, evaluate the different opinions advanced, and act 
 
 172. See Memorandum, Freedom of the Air, ACLU PAPERS (1935), microformed on American 
Civil Liberties Union Archives:  The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, 
GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.) [hereinafter Freedom of the Air]. 
 173. BENJAMIN, supra note 149, at 195. 
 174. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 237. 
 175. Freedom of the Air, supra note 172. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 237. 
 181. THE AMERICAN RADIO, supra note 166, at 246.  
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upon them.”182  Although stations maintained the policy of refusing to 
sell time on “controversial issues,” the NAB Code did direct station 
owners to provide free time for forums devoted to the “presentation of 
public questions including those of controversial nature.”183  The time 
was to be allotted with “fairness to all elements in a given 
controversy.”184  When they did air, the forum programs often tried to 
replicate the classic town meeting—the speakers were unpolished and 
the debate frank.185  However the programs’ rough quality made them 
unpopular, and broadcasters used their low ratings as a justification for 
shutting them down.186  A study in the 1940s found that only 15% of the 
country had been exposed to public forum programs, at the rate of about 
an hour a week, with half of it outside the best listening periods.187  
After the failure of its legislative efforts to create public forums on 
the air, the ACLU Radio Committee turned its attention to the FCC.  It 
urged the Commission to amend its regulations to require as a licensing 
condition that radio stations devote a set amount of time each week to 
discussion of controversial issues and that stations putting on programs 
involving controversial public issues extend equal time to at least one 
important, representative contrary view.188  It advocated the adoption of 
a public interest standard that would “encourage as great diversity as 
possible” in program content.189  These proposals for content-based 
regulation of the airwaves stirred the vocal opposition of the broadcast 
interests.190  The ACLU’s ideal of public discussion on the radio was a 
kind of managed debate in which the FCC, moderating the dialogue 
through its licensing conditions, made sure that particular groups were 
 
 182. Id.   
 183. Id. at 242.  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at  214-15.  
 186. Id.  
 187. THE AMERICAN RADIO, supra note 166, at 214.  
 188. Draft of Letter, supra note 161. 
 189. Id. 
 190. On broadcasters’ opposition to broadcast reform regulation, see MCCHESNEY, supra note 
129, at 117-20. 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/6
11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  2:25 PM 
2011] CREATING THE PUBLIC FORUM 837 
represented and that certain topics were discussed.191  This was the 
essence of censorship, the broadcasters argued.192 
In the course of these battles, the ACLU began to articulate a 
constitutional rationale for government involvement in radio.193  The 
First Amendment ideal of public discussion demanded that the state keep 
open the “channels to the marketplace of ideas” and that the public have 
access to diverse points of view.194  State supervision of broadcast 
content in this interest was constitutionally legitimate because of the 
structural properties of broadcasting.  Because of the finite number of 
radio frequencies, not everyone could speak on the radio.  When 
unpopular groups were denied space in a newspaper, they could 
potentially start an opposition outlet, but this was impossible in the radio 
context, given the constraints of the licensing system.  Freedom of the 
press, which meant the right to unfettered editorial discretion, was 
different from freedom of speech on the air. 
The ACLU publicized this theory in its efforts in the latter 1930s to 
break the major networks’ hold over broadcasting.195  Morris Ernst, who 
wrote a book length treatise on the topic, believed concentrated 
ownership of the media to be the single greatest threat to freedom of the 
press in modern times.196  Although the Communications Act had 
provided that licenses could be revoked if a station violated the antitrust 
laws, by the mid-1930s it was widely acknowledged that monopolistic 
practices in radio were widespread.197  In the late 1930s, the FCC, under 
the direction of James Lawrence Fly, appointed by FDR in 1938 to 
contain anti-New Deal sentiment on the radio, held hearings on radio 
ownership in which the ACLU participated.198  The hearings led to new 
 
 191. This would later be described by Alexander Meiklejohn as the First Amendment model of 
the democratic “town meeting.” Meiklejohn wrote well after the 1930s, but his model of managed 
debate as the ideal democratic speech situation was influenced by the broadcast reform movement.  
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 25 (1948).  For critiques of the town meeting model, see Post, supra note 8, at 1114; 
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV 20, 40 
(1975). 
 192. MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 117-20. 
 193. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON FREEDOM FROM CENSORSHIP (Jan. 5, 1939). 
 194. ACLU Brief, supra note 114, at *5. 
 195. For a general discussion of major network monopoly, see ERNST, supra note 95. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See, e.g., id. at 127. 
 198. Ernst urged the ACLU Radio Committee to support a proposed FCC rule against 
newspaper-radio cross-ownership, but Arthur Garfield Hays, one of the ACLU’s founders and one 
of the most avowedly libertarian on freedom of speech, successfully opposed the proposal, claiming 
that it would violate the First Amendment rights of newspapers, who would have lesser rights than 
other potential station owners.  Statement by Arthur Garfield Hays on Press-Radio Relation, ACLU 
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regulations that, in the interest of increasing local programming, 
prohibited networks from owning more than one station in any locality, 
gave affiliated stations the right to refuse a network program, and 
mandated the breakup of the two largest networks.199  The networks 
challenged the rule, claiming that the FCC’s role was limited to policing 
the wavelengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other and 
that any regulation beyond that was a violation of freedom of the 
press.200 
In 1942, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York rejected the networks’ claim.201  
Hand stated that the FCC’s prohibition on network contracts did not 
violate but furthered freedom of speech, since the interests protected 
were the “very interests which the First Amendment itself protects”—
listeners’ interest in a wide range of programming.202  The networks 
appealed to the Supreme Court, and a team of five lawyers on the 
ACLU, including Ernst, filed an amicus brief that characterized freedom 
of speech as embodying an affirmative requirement that the public have 
“access to diverse points of view and the right to pick and choose among 
them,”203 which was an essential condition of public discussion.  The 
state had a duty to “sponsor developments which . . . encourag[e] such 
diversity” and discourage “bottleneck contractual devices.”204  Because 
of the scarcity of radio frequencies and the powerful influence of the 
radio over public opinion, the state must regulate broadcasting to ensure 
that what went over the “radio pipe lines into the market of thought” was 
the “product of as many minds as possible.”205 
 
PAPERS (Mar. 5, 1942), microformed on American Civil Liberties Union Archives:  The Roger 
Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.).  
Hays believed this would result “in the theory that the first avenue of communication to the public 
which an individual selects is the only way in which he can communicate his ideas.”  The ACLU 
ultimately issued a statement, which it sent to FCC Commissioner Fly, that the Union was 
concerned that concentrated ownership of radio stations and newspapers “monopolized the channels 
of communication,” but that the fact that newspapers “are engaged in dealing with information and 
opinion should not disqualify them as applicants for radio licenses.”  Letter to James Lawrence Fly, 
ACLU PAPERS (Apr.1, 1942), microformed on American Civil Liberties Union Archives:  The 
Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly 
Res.). 
 199. See POWE, supra note 156, at 32. 
 200. Id. at 33-34. 
 201. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940 (1942). 
 202. Id. at 946. 
 203. ACLU Brief, supra note 114 at *4. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *7.  
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In an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court gestured 
towards the ACLU’s position.206  The structural limitations of radio—the 
scarcity of radio frequency—made freedom of the air different from 
freedom of the press. Because not everyone who wanted to speak on the 
radio could have access to the airwaves, it was not a violation of the 
First Amendment rights of broadcasters for the FCC to selectively grant 
licenses consistent with the “public interest.”207  The FCC was not 
merely to play traffic cop of the airwaves, but to determine the 
“composition of that traffic.”208  There were two possible interpretations 
of the Frankfurter opinion that were debated the time—one that the FCC 
could only control the “methods of competition” used by station owners, 
and the other that the FCC could supervise radio content.209  Zechariah 
Chafee advocated the former position,210 although the latter was widely 
held211 and has since been affirmed by courts upholding the First 
Amendment validity of FCC regulation of broadcast programming.212 
Freedom of the press meant an “unfettered editorial page,” FCC 
Commissioner James Fly often said, while “freedom of the radio” meant 
that licensees fulfill their “duty” of free speech.213  This duty, to present 
“all the facts and all points of view,” was “correlative to the right of the 
people to hear – a right essential to the preservation of democratic 
processes.”214  In the 1940s, the FCC used this rationale as the 
justification for a public interest standard that seemed to move towards 
the ACLU’s goal of “as great diversity as possible” on the air.215  In 
1940, the FCC issued its “Mayflower doctrine” in a case in which it 
denied a license to a station that had broadcast only the anti-Roosevelt 
 
 206. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
 207. Id. at 226-27. 
 208. Id. at  216. 
 209. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 580. 
 210. Id. 
 211. “There must be government regulation of radio in order to secure freedom of speech.  
Otherwise private censorship might effectively exclude minority groups from the air.”  Radio 
Censorship and the Federal Communications Commission, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 450 (1939); see also 
Radio Regulation and Freedom of the Air, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1220 (1941). 
 212. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969) (describing the decision in 
NBC: “The court upheld the regulations, unequivocally recognizing that the Commission was more 
than a traffic policeman concerned with the technical aspects of broadcasting and that it neither 
exceeded its powers under the statute nor transgressed the First Amendment in interesting itself in 
general program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees”). 
 213. James Lawrence Fly, Regulation of Radio in the Public Interest, 213 ANNALS OF AM. 
ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 102, 107 (1941).     
 214. Id.  
 215. Draft of Letter, supra note 161. 
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views of its owners.216  Broadcasters had an obligation not to 
editorialize, to “present all sides of important public questions,” and to 
“be sensitive to the problems of public concerns in the community and to 
make sufficient time available, on a nondiscriminatory basis, for the full 
discourse thereof.”217  The Mayflower decision was the forerunner of the 
Fairness Doctrine, announced by the FCC in 1949, which imposed a 
duty on stations to present controversial programming and to maintain 
an overall viewpoint balance in the programming.218  Following pressure 
from organized labor, in the 1940s the FCC issued an order that 
essentially threw open the door to sale of time for the discussion of 
controversial issues.219  In 1946, the FCC released its “Blue Book,” a 
149-page report that defined the public interest standard for licensing in 
terms of a “well-balanced program structure,” the carrying of local 
programs, and programs devoted to public issues.220  It stated that when 
ruling on a license renewal application, the FCC could consider whether 
time was made available for the discussion of public issues and diverse 
viewpoints and speakers were represented.221 
Broadcasters attacked the new public interest standards as an 
infringement of their First Amendment rights, and the postwar FCC 
seemed to ignore the Blue Book in its subsequent orders and 
decisions.222  The Fairness Doctrine was haphazardly enforced and 
eventually abolished by the FCC.223  The radio reform activists of the 
1930s and 1940s never saw broadcast become the public forum that they 
had envisioned.  They had, however, transformed public understandings 
of freedom of speech by popularizing a new model of democratic speech 
in the media age and highlighting the link between the ideal of public 
discussion and access to the means of communication.  In the 1940s, as 
we will see in the next sections, their ideas would be mobilized in efforts 
to create public forums in print journalism and public space. 
 
 216. See POWE, supra note 156, at 109-10. 
 217. Id.  
 218. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC 1246 (1949), cited in POWE, supra note 
156, at 111. 
 219. THE AMERICAN RADIO, supra note 166, at 80. 
 220. Id. at 192.   
 221. See generally id. at 182-93. 
 222. POWE, supra note 156, at 109; Varona, supra note 136, at 156. 
 223. See generally POWE, supra note 156. 
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III.  THE PRESS AS A PUBLIC FORUM 
A. Licensing the Press 
In the midst of a wave of criticism of the press, the 1930s and 
1940s saw a press reform movement that paralleled the broadcast reform 
effort.  The goal was similar—to involve the state in supervising the 
publishing process to ensure a wider range of viewpoints in the press.  
This was an essential precondition of “public discussion,” the reformers 
argued, and the First Amendment permitted state action to achieve this 
interest. 
Yet there were more formidable constitutional obstacles to 
regulating the press than radio.  Content based licensing was entirely 
anathema to freedom of the press, as the Supreme Court had affirmed in 
Near v. Minnesota.224  Yet press reformers argued that because of the 
importance of newspapers to public discourse, and the inability of 
average citizens to access the press as a means of communication, the 
licensing of newspapers was analogous to the licensing of radio and 
would be legitimate under the same constitutional rationale.225  They 
envisioned that print journalism, like broadcasting, could serve as a 
forum for public discussion and the exchange of diverse views, 
supervised by editors guided by “public interest” criteria designed and 
enforced by the state. 
Many of the arguments for newspapers as “public forums” 
originated in the work of the Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the 
Press.  The academic commission, organized by Time-Life publisher 
Henry Luce in 1944, was charged with producing a comprehensive 
report on the performance of the press, and a practical and theoretical 
analysis of the meaning of freedom of the press in modern times.  The 
Commission was headed by Zechariah Chafee and University of 
Chicago chancellor Robert Maynard Hutchins, and its roster included 
professors of law, anthropology, sociology, economics, and philosophy 
from the most elite universities.226  The group met seventeen times over 
two years and interviewed fifty-eight witnesses.227  By the time of its 
1947 release, its final report, A Free and Responsible Press, had been 
 
 224. 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931). 
 225. See CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 695. 
 226. Including John Clark, a professor of economics at Columbia, Robert Redfield, professor 
of anthropology at the University of Chicago, William Hocking, Harvard professor of philosophy, 
Harold Laswell, a law professor at Yale, and former Assistant Secretary of State Archibald 
MacLeish. See THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104, at v-vi. 
 227. Id. 
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revised nine times, mostly because of disagreement over the 
constitutional ramifications of government involvement in publishing.228  
Because of the prestige of its members and the vast public interest in the 
topic of press freedom, the Hutchins Commission received tremendous 
popular and scholarly attention.  A Free and Responsible Press remains 
one of the most important studies of the press in American history.229 
The Commission began from the assumption that a reconsideration 
of the principles of freedom underlying the First Amendment had 
become a matter of urgent concern.230  It then described the paradox of 
mass communications: 
The importance of the press to the people has greatly increased with 
the development of the press as an instrument of mass communication.  
At the same time the development of the press as an instrument of 
mass communication has greatly decreased the proportion of the 
people who can express their opinions and ideas through the press.231 
The Commission concluded that the press had a social 
responsibility, as a condition for its freedom, to provide the public with 
the information necessary for responsible citizenship and to represent 
diverse views.232  The press had failed this duty, it concluded.233  Press 
content was inaccurate, biased towards big business, and excluded the 
views and opinions of minority social groups.234  The press did not 
provide a credible and truthful portrayal of world affairs, nor 
“project[ed] the opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to one 
another.”235  It had not fulfilled its social obligation to serve a public 
“forum for the exchange of comment and criticism” and “common 
carriers of public discussion.”236 
Luce, who funded the research but exercised no control over it, had 
initiated the Commission in his hope of attaining a definitive statement 
 
 228. See id. 
 229. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 27-28 (1991). 
 230. See THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104. 
 231. Id. at 1. 
 232. On the social responsibility theory of the press, see FRED S. SIEBERT, THEODORE 
PETERSON, & WILBUR SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS:  THE AUTHORITARIAN, 
LIBERTARIAN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOVIET COMMUNIST CONCEPTS OF WHAT THE PRESS 
SHOULD BE AND DO 95 (1956).  “Social responsibility theory holds that the government must not 
merely allow freedom; it must also actively promote it.”  Id. 
 233. See generally THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104, at ch. 4. 
 234. Id. at 21 & ch. 2. 
 235. Id. at 21. 
 236. Id. at 23. 
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of freedom of the press as a principle of absolute liberty in publishing.237  
This aspiration went unrealized.  In fact, several Commission members 
went in the opposite direction and endorsed extensive government 
regulation of press ownership and content.238  Some supported content 
based licensing and a public right to access the press.239 
The centerpiece of this vision was a “Free Press Authority,” a 
regulatory agency for print journalism similar to the Federal 
Communications Commission.  The authority would license newspapers 
under the condition that the papers express the differing ideas, points of 
view, and cultural interests of each group in the community and allow 
the public to hear to varied interpretations and opinions regarding all 
major public issues.240  This would be measured by governmentally 
established “yardsticks” of diversity.241  Papers would have to devote 
free space to minority opinions and interests proportional to their 
representation in the community.242  Law professor Harold Lasswell 
advocated a similar proposal that any newspaper that dominated its 
community, with little or no effective competition, be forced to run a 
public forum page that would be centrally edited by a government 
commission.243  The purpose of the licensing system was to “assure 
maintenance in all newspapers of open space and opportunity for free, 
unhampered expression of opinion by citizens in the community or in 
the nation, of opinions which differ from those held by publishers and 
advanced in their papers.”244  Publishing delays on controversial 
opinions intended to “devitalize” them would be grounds for license 
revocation.245  A “Court of Appeals” under the Free Press Authority 
would act on complaints.246 
Another popular proposal was that the press be run as a common 
carrier, with everyone who wanted access to be able to have it by paying 
a standard rate.247  Aware that this would encroach on editors’ ability to 
control the content of their papers, some on the Hutchins Commission 
 
 237. Government News Gag Press Freedom Problem, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Apr. 8, 1944. 
 238. See Bates, supra note 98. 
 239. Id. 
 240. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 694-95. 
 241. Id. at 695. 
 242. Id. at 694-95. 
 243. Bates, supra note 98. 
 244. HAROLD L. ICKES, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS TODAY:  A CLINICAL EXAMINATION BY 28 
SPECIALISTS 130 (1941). 
 245. Id. at 131. 
 246. Id. 
 247. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 633. 
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argued that the common carrier idea could square with the First 
Amendment if it were limited to the newspaper’s news functions.248  The 
news function was more important than the editorial function because of 
the “need of the community to know the truth.”249  “When the press 
comes in as a private news agency to supply that need, the community 
has to supervise the press and is not prevented from doing so by the First 
Amendment, which is concerned with the editorial function.”250  In the 
end, the Commission recommended the common carrier only as an 
analogue, not as a legal principle.251  None on the Commission broached 
government ownership of the press, agreeing that despite the failings of 
the commercial press, a privately-owned press would better serve the 
interests of a democratic people than a state owned press.252 
Chafee led the charge on the Commission against the licensing 
proposals, which he attacked as “compulsory open-mindedness,”253 
unconstitutionally vague and the “most magnificent opportunity to fetter 
the press which has ever existed in English speaking countries.”254  
Chafee’s primary opponent on the Commission was William Hocking, a 
Harvard philosopher who had promoted the licensing proposals as 
consistent with the constitutional ideal of “freedom of discussion.”255  
Hocking insisted that the Commission make a distinction between 
freedom of the press and freedom of speech.256  Hocking believed that 
editors had the right to free speech on their editorial pages — to print 
their own arguments and opinions—but freedom of the press meant 
readers’ right to receive adequate news.257 
Chafee acknowledged that the public had an interest in diverse 
perspectives in print journalism, and that this interest was consistent 
with the goals of the First Amendment.258  But press content could not 
be compelled by the state consistent with the Constitution.259  Despite its 
endorsement of government involvement in broadcasting, the ACLU 
 
 248. Id.   
 249. Id. at 633.  
 250. Id. 
 251. See Bates, supra note 98. 
 252. Id.  
 253. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 629. 
 254. Id. at 696. 
 255. On the debate between Chafee and Hocking, see DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, 
JR.:  DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 108 (1986). 
 256. Id. 
 257. See generally WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS:  A FRAMEWORK OF 
PRINCIPLE:  A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1947). 
 258. See CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 474. 
 259. See generally CHAFEE, supra note 119. 
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shared Chafee’s position, arguing that the rationale for regulation of 
radio—technological medium scarcity—did not apply in the newspaper 
context and that content-based licensing infringed on freedom of the 
press.260  Backed by Morris Ernst of the ACLU, Chafee advocated 
antitrust law as a content-neutral mechanism to create a greater range of 
viewpoints in the press through dispersed ownership.261 
B. A “Multitude of Tongues” 
In the Associated Press case of 1945, the Supreme Court, while 
affirming that the public has an interest in news from diverse 
perspectives and sources, reiterated that government interference with 
editorial control over content was constitutionally off limits, even if it 
led to the presentation of public affairs from multiple viewpoints—in a 
“multitude of tongues.”262  Like Chafee, the Associated Press majority 
endorsed antitrust law as a potential solution to viewpoint homogeneity 
in the press that was consistent with the First Amendment. 
The Associated Press litigation began in 1942, when the 
Department of Justice filed suit in the District Court in the Southern 
District of New York against the Associated Press, the largest 
newsgathering cooperative in the country.263  Under its bylaws, the AP 
allowed a newspaper with membership in a given community to prevent 
another in the same area from obtaining membership by demanding a 
vote on the competitor’s application.264  The bylaws also required 
members to supply reports of regional news solely to the Associated 
Press and prohibited sharing news with nonmembers.265  It was 
essentially impossible for a newspaper in this time to succeed without 
AP membership.  The Justice Department alleged that the AP’s bylaws 
were unlawful restraints of trade that limited competition in the 
newspaper industry in violation of the Sherman Act.266  
 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Assoc. Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Assoc. Press., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)). 
 263. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. at 373. 
 264. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Associated Press Antitrust Suit:  A Philosophical Clash Over 
Ownership of First Amendment Rights, 61 BUS. HIST. REV. 44 (1987). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 52.  The Justice Department’s action had been spurred by the exhortations of 
department store magnate Marshall Field, who had tried unsuccessfully to obtain Associated Press 
membership for his new, pro-Roosevelt newspaper the Chicago Sun.  Field was opposed by 
publisher Robert McCormick of the Chicago Tribune, who was rabidly against the New Deal.  
McCormick tried to block Field’s membership in the Associated Press.  After having unsuccessfully 
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The majority of the three-judge panel, consisting of judges Learned 
Hand and Augustus Hand, granted the Justice Department’s motion for 
summary judgment without proof of actual exclusion.267  Rather than 
question whether a restraint of trade had occurred, Hand used what 
Chafee advocated as a “public service theory” and distinguished 
newspapers from other industries, then focused on consumer welfare 
rather than just the interest of competitors.268  The opinion suggested that 
the importance of the news to “the vitality of our democratic 
government”269 gave the state a greater interest in supervising the press 
than other industries.  The First Amendment protected the public’s 
interest in the “dissemination of news from as many . . . sources, and 
with as many different facets and colors as is possible.”270  It 
“presupposes that [the] right conclusions are . . . likely to be gathered out 
of a multitude of tongues.”271 
When the ACLU Board became aware of the suit, there was an 
extended debate about whether to get involved in it.  Ernst believed that 
the case involved important civil liberties issues—the deprivation of the 
public of information it should have by private forces “creating serious 
bottlenecks on the news”—and that the organization should become 
involved.272  Arthur Garfield Hays, one of the ACLU’s founders and a 
staunch libertarian on freedom of speech,  insisted that there was no civil 
liberties question at stake and that it was neither the business of the 
Constitution or the ACLU “to make certain that people have equal 
opportunities” to engage a public audience.273  Signaling the 
organization’s new trend towards the separation of economic issues and 
freedom of speech, the ACLU ultimately issued a public statement that 
 
tried other approaches to winning Associate Press membership, Field asked the Attorney General 
whether it functioned as a “monopoly in restraint of newspaper competition” and thereby violated 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.  See Id. at 50. 
 267. For a discussion, see generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION:  FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA (1991). 
 268. Id. at 209. 
 269. Assoc. Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1, 29 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring).  
 270. United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943). 
 271. Id.  Allowing more papers to receive AP service would seem to foster homogeneity in 
news content, yet Hand claimed that because every paper had its own way of treating wire service 
news—some placed it on the front page and others in an “obscure corner,” and the accompanying 
editorials were different—the result of increased access to AP was more “diversity” and therefore 
greater accuracy.  The real issue was that non-AP papers could not survive, which led to further 
concentration in the publishing industry.  Id. 
 272. Letter from Morris Ernst to Roger N. Baldwin (Nov. 6, 1942) (on file with author). 
 273. Memorandum on the Associated Press Case, ACLU PAPERS (Sept. 23, 1942), 
microformed on American Civil Liberties Union Archives:  The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, 
MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.). 
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private restrictions on competition in the newspaper field did not create a 
First Amendment problem but was rather a question of public policy.274 
The AP appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sherman 
Act could not be used against the press, since the First Amendment 
shielded the press from regulation.275  The American Newspaper 
Publishers’ Association claimed that if Hand’s opinion were sustained, 
Americans would be confronted “just as the people of Germany today 
are confronted, with a government controlled press.”276  In June 1945, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, affirmed that 
the AP’s bylaws violated the Sherman Act and that antitrust law could 
be applied to news publishing consistent with the First Amendment.277  
The Court rejected Hand’s broader “public service” approach to the case 
and brought it back to a traditional restraint of trade analysis.278  
“Member publishers of AP are engaged in business for profit exactly as 
are other business men who sell food, steel, aluminum, or anything else 
people need or want.”279  The fact that the commodity was news did not 
exempt them from the obligations carried by other industries. 
The principle that the First Amendment did not foreclose the 
enforcement of generally applicable business regulations against the 
press had been established in cases in the 1930s in which publishers had 
tried to use freedom of the press as a shield against New Deal regulatory 
measures.280  In a 1936 case involving the Associated Press, the Court 
held that the Wagner Act281 could be used against newspaper publishers 
without violating freedom of the press.282  The Wagner Act’s prohibition 
on the discharge of employees on the basis of union affiliation—in this 
case, editors—did not violate the First Amendment freedom to control 
editorial content.283  In 1937, the Court found frivolous a claim that 
 
 274. Memorandum, ACLU PAPERS (July 6, 1942), microformed on American Civil Liberties 
Union Archives:  The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE JC599 .U5 
A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.). 
 275. “The flat prohibition against the regulation of the press in one direction, as contained in 
the First Amendment, does not endow Congress with [the] power to regulate it in another direction, 
even in aid of its freedom.” Brief of the American Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus 
Curiae at *9, Assoc. Press v. United States, Nos. 57, 58, 59 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1944), 1944 WL 42542 
(Oct. 24, 1944). 
 276. J. EDWARD GERALD, THE PRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1931-1947, at 119 (1948). 
 277. Assoc. Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
 278. See generally POWE, supra note 267. 
 279. Assoc. Press, 326 U.S. at 7. 
 280. See, e.g., Assoc. Press v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 131-33 (1936); Senn v. 
Tile Layers’ Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937). 
 281. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 1935). 
 282. Assoc. Press, 301 U.S. at 130. 
 283. Id. at 131-33. 
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newspapers enjoyed a constitutional immunity from a general 
nondiscriminatory tax.284 
The decree calling for revision of the bylaws, and forcing the AP to 
sell on equal terms, did not interfere with editorial functions, Black 
wrote.285  It did not force the AP or its members to “permit publication 
of anything which their ‘reason’ tells them should not be published. It 
only provides that after their ‘reason’ has permitted publication of news, 
they shall not, for their own financial advantage, unlawfully combine to 
limit its publication.”286  Moreover, the application of antitrust law to the 
press furthered the public’s interest in diverse viewpoints in journalism, 
a necessary condition of public discussion.  “The First Amendment . . . 
rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the 
welfare of the public.”287  But government compulsion of press content 
to achieve viewpoint diversity, he emphasized, was anathema to freedom 
of the press.288 
Frankfurter, in his concurrence, parted with Black and endorsed the 
Hand position in its entirety.289  He suggested that he would have 
approved more extensive government control over news publishing than 
other industries because the “truth regarding public matters” was a 
constitutional interest that was “indispensable”290 to public discussion 
and the “vitality of our democratic government.”291  He did not think that 
the commercial and editorial functions of the press could be 
disaggregated, and this cut in favor of regulation of all aspects of 
publishing.  “Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts or 
potatoes,” so restraints on the “promotion of truth”292 invoked very 
 
 284. See Giragi v. Moore, 301 U.S. 670 (1937). 
 285. Assoc. Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 20.   
 288. The majority opinion observed that the “only compulsion to print which appears in the 
record” was found in AP’s bylaws, which “compel members of the Association to print some AP 
news or subject themselves to fine or expulsion from membership in the Association.”  Id. at 20 
n.18. 
 289. Id. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 290. Id. at 28. 
 291. Assoc. Press, 326 U.S. at 29.  Frankfurter had been highly influenced by popular and 
academic press criticism.  In a 1946 case, Frankfurter complained that “[t]here are today 
incomparably more effective and more widespread means for the dissemination of ideas and 
information than in the past.  But a steady shrinkage of a diffused ownership raises far reaching 
questions regarding the meaning of the ‘freedom’ of a free press.”  Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 
331, 355 n.2 (1946).  Journalistic codes of ethics, he suggested, were “moonshine” and the press 
could only be controlled with legal penalties.  See id. at n.13. 
 292. Assoc. Press, 326 U.S. at 28. 
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different considerations from comparable restraints on purely 
commercial industries.293  Justice Murphy, one of the dissenters along 
with Stone and Roberts, also saw the different dimensions of publishing 
as intertwined, but this cut against regulation.  Both he and Justice 
Roberts lamented the decision as “affirmative intervention by the 
government in the realm of dissemination of information” and a “first 
step in the shackling of the press, which will subvert the constitutional 
freedom to print or to withhold, to print as and how one’s reason or 
one’s interest dictates.”294 
Associated Press ushered in a wave of antitrust enforcement against 
the press295 and put the imprimatur of the Court on the media reformers’ 
argument that the public has a constitutional interest in newspaper 
journalism as a forum for diverse perspectives on public affairs.  At the 
same time, the decision also staked the First Amendment limitations of 
government regulation of privately owned expressive property, even in 
the interest of increasing public access to communication opportunities 
and to information on matters of public concern.  Coming on the heels of 
the NBC decision, Associated Press affirmed a “dual system” of 
constitutional freedom of the press.  As Lee Bollinger argues, 
government supervision of radio reflects a commitment to “freedom of 
discussion,” democratic deliberation and government encouragement of 
a diversity of views, while the broad First Amendment protection given 
to print journalism embodies a kind of “free speech laissez-faire.”296  
The final report of the Hutchins Commission adopted the 
Associated Press solution, suggesting only the “sparing” use of antitrust 
laws to further diversity in newspaper ownership and content.  
Appealing to the newspaper publishing industry’s sense of professional 
responsibility, the Commission asked that the press voluntarily “accept 
the responsibilities of common carriers of information and discussion,” 
finance media undertakings “of high literary, artistic, or intellectual 
quality,” and “engage in vigorous mutual criticism,” as professional but 
not legal obligations.297  The Supreme Court, thirty years later in Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, channeled the Hutchins Commission 
 
 293. One of the most conservative on the Court on freedom of speech in this era, Frankfurter 
opposed the “preferred position” theory endorsed by his colleagues and used a balancing test that 
deferred heavily to legislative judgment.  H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 171 
(1981). 
 294. Assoc. Press, 326 U.S. at 48, 51 (Roberts, J. & Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 295. See e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). 
 296. See BOLLINGER, supra note 229, at 110. 
 297. THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104, at 92-94; CHAFEE, supra 
note 119. 
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when it struck down a right of reply law, concluding that “[a] 
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press 
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other 
virtues it cannot be legislated.”298  Publishers disliked the Commission 
but acknowledged it, and in the late 1940s the major publishers’ 
associations sponsored several initiatives for editorial reform and 
committees for self-examination.299  But by the mid-1950s, it was widely 
believed that the press had not implemented the Commission’s 
suggestions.300 
The failure of the campaigns to create public forums in broadcast 
and print coincided with renewed interest in old-fashioned, face-to-face 
communication in the traditional public forum.  In his Government and 
Mass Communications, Chafee argued that because radio and 
newspapers could not be used as public information highways—
“highroads” for news and ideas, he wrote301—the government should 
provide streets, parks, and auditoriums to promote oral discussion.302  
Outside of the media, there must be essential “physical facilities” for 
communication accessible to all.303  Chafee believed that “the 
construction of a municipal auditorium for public meetings is 
disconnected with the possibilities of censorship of organized media.”  
“[A]side from the occasional banning of an unpopular speaker or group, 
harm to free speech is unlikely and positive good is plain.”304    
In a series of cases in the 1940s, the Supreme Court similarly 
indicated that opportunities for public speech on public property must be 
protected and facilitated by the state because of limitations on citizens’ 
ability to use the media for communication.  This obligation was 
imposed by the First Amendment.  The public forum doctrine reflected 
the Court’s emerging awareness that the “parade, the picket, the leaflet, 
[and] the sound truck”305 were the only media of communication 
 
 298. 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). 
 299. See generally Blanchard, supra note 264. 
 300. The major publishers had also rebelled against the Associated Press decision.  In 1946, 
publisher Robert McCormick of the Chicago Tribune had convinced a representative from Illinois 
to introduce a bill in Congress that would exempt cooperative newsgathering associations from the 
nation’s antitrust laws.  The ACLU, reversing its earlier position, became involved in the issue and 
opposed the bill, asserting that newspapers were businesses, and they could not claim exemption 
from the antitrust laws as long as those laws did not impair “freedom to print and discuss.”  The 
Mason bill died in committee in 1947.  See Blanchard, supra note 264, at 70-82. 
 301. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 479. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 477. 
 305. Kalven, supra note 1, at 30. 
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accessible to those who lacked “money to own or control publishing 
plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show 
places.”306 
IV.  THE PUBLIC FORUM IN PHYSICAL SPACE 
A. The Public Forum Doctrine 
The public forum doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme Court in 
the 1940s, protects a minimum right of access to streets, parks and other 
government-owned sites for expressive purposes.307  The doctrine grew 
out of the same cultural environment and concerns as the “public forum” 
campaigns in broadcast and print.  Like the media public forums, the 
physical public forum would provide communication opportunities for 
groups and speakers otherwise unable to access the media.  Unlike the 
proposed radio and newspaper public forums, however, the physical 
public forum was to be governed by the principle of viewpoint 
neutrality.  The forum managers would not engineer debate between 
competing viewpoints, but would allow free rein to speakers, subject to 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.308 
 
 306. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 307. In the public forum context, the Court has recognized that restrictions on the  
distribution of leaflets and similar means of communication may have a disproportionate 
effect upon those who, for reasons of finances or ideology, do not have ready access to 
more conventional means of communication.  In such circumstances, the Court has 
reviewed restrictions on such traditional but unconventional means of communication by 
a more stringent standard than other content-neutral restrictions.   
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. MARY L. REV. 189, 219 
(1983). 
 308. The central principle of the public forum, as articulated in the foundational cases of the 
1940s, has been much debated.  Some have argued that the essence of the public forum was equal 
access.  The state can entirely ban access to the forum but it cannot selectively open it to some 
speakers and not others.  Professor Lillian BeVier has written that the public forum cases adopt “no 
norm or idealized vision of quality or quantity of public debate except that which results from . . . 
government neutrality.”  BeVier, supra note 2, at 102.  Kenneth Karst has argued that the “equality 
principle” of the First Amendment—that freedom of speech protects equal liberty of ideas—was 
developed in the public forum cases.  Karst, supra note 191. 
  But it is clear that the Court also adopted a minimum access principle—that the state 
must, “even at some cost to the public fisc, have to provide at least a minimally adequate 
opportunity for the exercise of certain freedoms.” LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786, 979-80 (2d ed. 1988).  Franklyn Haiman has described the public 
forum as a kind of “affirmative action” for speech.  Government enhancement of citizen expression 
by “making available public sidewalks, streets, and parks for speeches or demonstrations” has “long 
been recognized as a minimal contribution expected of the state to the facilitation of a marketplace 
of ideas.”  FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 297-98 (1981). 
43
Barbas: Creating the Public Forum
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  2:25 PM 
852 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:809 
The foundational case is Hague v. Committee for Industrial 
Organization, from 1939.309  Hague involved efforts by notorious Jersey 
City Mayor Frank Hague to quash the CIO through a statute that 
prohibited the distribution of pamphlets in public places, and forbade 
unions leasing public halls for public meetings unless they received a 
permit, which was at the discretion of city officials.310  There was also an 
ordinance that required hall owners to obtain a rental permit that was 
also at the discretion of city officials.311  Most cities did not require 
permits for the renting of private halls, but owners who rented halls to 
radicals sometimes found their licenses revoked because of the 
“structural . . .  condition” of the building.312 
Before Hague, ordinances allowing the discretionary awarding of 
permits for public speech, and closing off all public spaces for speech, 
had been routinely upheld by courts as a legitimate exercise of the police 
power.313  The state had the rights of a private property owner.  In the 
famous 1895 case Davis v. Massachusetts, Oliver Wendell Holmes, as 
Chief Justice of Massachusetts’ highest court, declared that laws that 
prohibited public speaking in a public park were no more an 
infringement of the rights of the public than “for the owner of a private 
house to forbid it in his house.”314  Courts were not sympathetic to 
claims that access to public space was necessary for the exercise of free 
speech rights, or that it was especially vital for minority groups who 
lacked access to the press.315 
In Hague, the Court transformed the state from the owner of the 
streets and parks to the trustee of such public places, to which it must 
provide minimum access on an equal and nondiscriminatory basis, 
regardless of viewpoint.316  In dictum, Justice Roberts, writing for the 
plurality, observed that the use of the streets and parks, “immemorially 
. . . held in trust for the use of the public,” was for “[the] purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions” an essential part of the “privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens.”317  The rights of speakers, however, were still 
 
 309. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 310. Id. at 500-03. 
 311. Id.  
 312. See Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England and the United States:  A 
Comparative Study, 47 YALE L.J. 404, 421 (1938). 
 313. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass. 1895).  
 314. Id. at 511. 
 315. See Pfohl, supra note 2, at 549. 
 316. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514-15 (1939). 
 317. Id. at 515.   
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subordinate to the state’s power to regulate for the public good.  The 
privilege of a citizen to 
use the streets and parks for communication of views on national 
questions may be regulated in the interest[s] of all . . . it is not absolute, 
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general 
comfort and convenience, . . . but it must not, in the guise of 
regulation, be abridged or denied.318 
The state could not entirely close access to the public forum, Hague 
suggested, nor use permitting systems as a guise for content-based 
discrimination.  The ordinances were void on their face because they 
were not passed to serve the general welfare and placed uncontrolled 
discretion in the hands of local officials to commit “arbitrary suppression 
of [the] free expression of views on national affairs.”319 
The public forum doctrine was subsequently developed by the 
Court in a series of cases involving traditional forms of public 
communication in public places.  In four cases consolidated in Schneider 
v. State of New Jersey, from 1939, involving the convictions of labor 
protesters, political radicals, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Court struck 
down local ordinances that made it unlawful for any person to circulate 
or distribute handbills on any sidewalk, street, or public place.320  
Although the state may implement reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions, the Court held, it cannot entirely block citizen access to 
traditional public forums for speech, nor resolve competing claims of 
access in a discriminatory manner.321  As Harry Kalven Jr. wrote years 
later, summarizing the doctrine, 
In an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public 
places are an important facility for public discussion and political 
process.  They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can 
commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such facilities 
are made available is an index of freedom.322 
Professor Robert Post has argued that the public forum concept 
demonstrated a general concern with official suppression of participation 
 
 318. Id. at 515-16.  
 319. Id. at 516.  
 320. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).  A 1941 study observed that of the 
fifty-five handbill cases that were brought throughout the country during the previous fifty years, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, labor unions and minority political groups were defendants in most of the 
cases.  See James K. Lindsay, Council and Court:  The Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939, MICH. L. 
REV. 561, 590 (1941). 
 321. Id. at 150..  
 322. Kalven, supra note 1, at 11-12.  
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in public discourse rather than a more specific interest in the flourishing 
of public speech in public places.323  He points out that the public forum 
cases technically imposed the same kind of restrictions on the 
government’s ability to regulate speech in circumstances that did not 
involve public forums.324  “The Court held that street demonstrations 
could not be [held] . . . to the whim of official discretion,” but it applied 
the same standard to distribution of pamphlets to private homes, and 
speech in private halls.325  “In short,” he writes, “the precedents indicate 
that the Court’s primary concern was to protect [communication] . . . and 
that the geographical location of . . . [the communication] played a 
relatively minor role in that concern.”326  Given the historical context, 
the focus on streets, parks, and town squares has more significance than 
Post has ascribed to it.  
We must remember the widespread concern in this era with the 
disappearance of traditional public space and local communities in the 
face of nationalizing, urbanizing, modernizing forces.  Critics had 
claimed that as citizens retreated to their private homes to consume radio 
and newspapers, public discussion and community spaces for discussion 
were abandoned.  Asserting a right to speak on the street was a statement 
about the continued value of public space and the importance of 
articulating ideas in a face-to-face context.  Kalven believed that these 
cases “recognize[d] the special nature and value of [that] . . . claim to be 
on the street.”327  In Schneider, the majority rejected the argument that 
the ordinances were limited to streets and alleys, leaving other places for 
speech open.328  “The streets are natural and proper places for the 
dissemination of information and opinion,” the majority stated.329  The 
Court saw the street as a “kind of public hall,” in Kalven’s words, “a 
public communication facility” bearing democratic significance and the 
weight of historical tradition.330 
Given their likely inability to speak through the press and radio, for 
marginalized and oppressed groups, public spaces are an essential means 
of communication.  This was argued by the Bill of Rights Committee of 
the American Bar Association, a group of liberal lawyers and law 
professors that included Zechariah Chafee, in an amicus brief filed in 
 
 323. Post, supra note 2, at 202-05.   
 324. Id.  
 325. Id. at 202-03  
 326. Id. at 203.  
 327. Kalven, supra note 1, at 19.  
 328. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 159-60 (1939).  
 329. Id. at 163.  
 330. Kalven, supra note 1, at 12. 
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Hague.331  The brief, which the Court noted and made use of, argued that 
“in view of the importance of the open air meeting as a332 . . . vitally 
important medium of public discussion,”333 the city must “in some 
adequate manner provide places”334 for public meetings because groups 
and individuals promoting unpopular causes generally “do not have the 
financial means to . . . purchase time on the radio.”335  Speeches in 
“municipal auditoriums, church forums, and parks in summer”336 did not 
require funds to access, and therefore had a “special function in the field 
of free expression that is fulfilled by no other medium.”337 
The trial court had used similar reasoning when it enjoined Jersey 
City officials from interfering with the union’s distribution of leaflets 
and circulars. 
The communication of thought, unless you believe in mind-reading, 
requires some mechanical means.  In the case of speech, one needs 
some place to speak in and some people to listen.  The public meeting 
has been called the “platform of the poor.”  Lacking the money or 
perhaps in Jersey City the goodwill, sufficient to obtain some private 
place, the would-be orators are forced to resort to publicly owned 
places.338 
The Third Circuit, affirming, noted that public spaces “must be 
open” for the use of the people to exercise their rights of free speech and 
assembly.339  “If this were not so it is obvious that these rights would be 
but empty forms” for those unable to access privately owned means of 
expression.340 
 
 331. Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, American Bar Association, Hague v. Comm. 
for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (No. 651), 1939 WL 48753. 
 332. Id. at *26. 
 333. Id. at *5. 
 334. Id. at *31. 
 335. Id. at *28. 
 336. See generally id. 
 337. Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, supra note 331, at *27.   
Public debate and discussion take many forms including the spoken and the printed 
word, the radio, and the screen.  But . . . assemblies face to face perform a function of 
vital significance in the American system, and are no less important at the present time 
for the education of the public and the formation of opinion than they have been in our 
past history. 
Id. at *7.  The brief also called for the establishment of “Hyde Parks” of sufficient number and “so 
located as to provide effectively for free outdoor public discussion.”  Id. at *31.  
 338. Comm. for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 145 (1939).  
 339. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774, 785 (1939). 
 340. Id. 
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This view of the public forum as the “platform for the poor” was 
articulated in two prominent postwar cases involving loudspeaker 
speech.  Saia v. New York, from 1948, involved a Jehovah’s Witness 
who gave lectures in the public park in Lockport, New York using sound 
equipment mounted atop his car.341  He was arrested under an ordinance 
that gave the Chief of Police discretion to reject applications for the use 
of loudspeaker equipment.342  In the immediate postwar era, the dispute 
between municipalities and various political and religious groups over 
the use of loudspeakers became a grassroots battle for civil liberties 
waged in parks and on the sidewalks and streets.  In New York, groups 
ranging from labor unions to the National Republican Club challenged 
regulations on sound trucks and sound amplifiers that required would-be 
users to obtain permits from the police department.343  Protesters without 
permits took to the streets and read the First Amendment using 
amplifying equipment until they were arrested.344 
The majority in Saia struck down the ordinance on the grounds that 
it sanctioned uncontrolled discretion by officials and hence 
discriminatory access to the public forum.345  The power to approve or 
deny applications gave officials the ability to conduct unconstitutional 
content-based discrimination of speech.346  The law, which had the same 
effect as a prior restraint, was a device for the “suppression of free 
communication of ideas.”347  It could be used to deny unpopular groups 
access to what was for them a crucially important medium of expression.  
Particularly for those without access to the media, loudspeakers are 
“today indispensable instruments of effective public speech,” Justice 
Douglas observed.348  As Saia’s lawyer had written, “the radio, [and] the 
public press”349 were accessible only to the highest bidder.  If the mass 
 
 341. Saia v. NewYork, 334 U.S. 558, 560-62 (1948). 
 342. Id. at 558-59. 
 343. See, e.g,. Saia, 334 U.S. 558; Test of Sound Truck Ban is Noisy Despite Polite Police and 
Pickets, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1948; Loudspeaker Ban Is Fought by ALP, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
1948. 
 344. See Test of Sound Truck Ban is Noisy Despite Polite Police and Pickets, supra note 343; 
Loudspeaker Ban Is Fought by ALP, supra note 343. 
 345. Saia, 334 U.S. at 560-62. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at 562. 
 348. Id. at 561. 
 349. See Brief for Appellant at *5, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (No. 504), 1948 
WL 47556.  
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media were the sole outlets for public speech, then “free speech [was] 
not available.”350 
This was the argument of the dissent the following year in Kovacs 
v. Cooper, in which a plurality led by Justice Reed rejected Saia’s theory 
of the public forum.351  The Court upheld a Trenton, New Jersey city 
ordinance that, in the stated interests of preventing the nuisance of noise 
pollution, barred the use of loudspeakers mounted on any vehicle on the 
city’s public streets.352  Kovacs had been arrested under the statute for 
using a sound truck to publicize a labor dispute.353  The plurality 
distinguished Saia because the Trenton ordinance applied across the 
board to all loudspeaker use and thus avoided the problem of invidious 
discretion.354  A city could constitutionally close the public forum to all 
loudspeaker use, because loudspeakers forced speech on unwilling 
listeners and impaired the state’s interest in public order.355  The 
plurality acknowledged that “sound trucks, perhaps borrowed without 
cost from some zealous supporter[s]”356 allowed minority groups to 
reach large audiences but rejected the argument that they were necessary 
for communication when other “easy means of publicity are open,” such 
as “the human voice,” “pamphlets,”357 and “radio.”358 
The dissent by Black, Douglas and Rutledge argued that the 
plurality position violated the First Amendment requirement of 
minimum access to the public forum.359  The notion that minority groups 
could easily get time on the radio was entirely false.  “There are many 
people who have ideas that they wish to disseminate but who do not 
have enough money”360 to “obtain the support of newspapers” or “to buy 
advertising from newspapers, radios, or moving pictures.”361  
“Everybody knows [that] . . . these powerful channels of communication 
. . . from the very nature of our economic system, must be under the 
control and guidance of comparatively few people.”362  Media owners 
 
 350. Id.  See also Morrie Benson & Edward S. Resnick, Sound Amplifiers:  Nuisance or Free 
Speech?, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 103 (1949). 
 351. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949). 
 352. Id. at 78. 
 353. Id. at 79. 
 354. Id. at 82-85.  
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 88. 
 357. Id. at 89. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at 103 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 360. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 361. Id. at 103 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 362. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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would never give fair coverage to ideas they opposed, held by those 
without “wealth and power.”363 
Laws that prohibited non-media speakers from being able to reach a 
public audience gave “preference” in the dissemination of ideas to the 
“owners of legally favored instruments of communication”364 and 
perpetuated economic and political inequalities by “tip[ping] the scales 
against the transmission of ideas through public speaking,”365 the dissent 
wrote.  Without access to the public forum, minority groups would be 
voiceless.  Without the ability to use loudspeakers, they would be 
drowned out by the media.  The effect of the decision was to add to the 
“overpowering influence” of mass media in the marketplace of ideas.366  
The dissent argued, in effect, that the right to free expression included a 
right to effective expression—as ACLU lawyers described it, the right 
“of a man to communicate his thoughts to his fellows, and not alone the 
right to express those thoughts.”367 
B. Embodied Communication 
During this era of critical concern with modernity’s transformation 
of social relations and the geography of everyday life, the Court 
acknowledged that the marketplace of ideas is not only a metaphor—at 
one point, it was really a place.  It suggested that in-person speech in the 
public forum, in contrast to disembodied mass communication, provokes 
personal relationships and deep engagement with other citizens and 
critical issues in a way that mass communications cannot.  Traditional 
forms of communication were well-suited to the purposes of minority 
political and religious groups seeking to confront, persuade, and 
challenge entrenched majoritarian thought.  The Court recognized, to use 
a phrase not yet in common parlance, that the “medium is the 
message”—the forms and contexts of speech have communicative 
impact, which must be taken into consideration when determining the 
validity of any regulation of speech.368 
 
 363. Id. at 104 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 364. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 365. Id. at 103 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 366. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 367. Brief for Respondent at 43, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 25 F.Supp. 127 (1939) (No. 
651), 1939 WL 48838 at *43. 
 368. As Justice Jackson wrote in Kovacs, “The moving picture screen, the radio, the 
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, 
abuses, and dangers. Each…is a law unto itself.”  336 U.S. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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The Court recognized the particular importance of access to the 
public forum for religious proselytizers who depended on classical free 
expression activities like pamphleting.369  Pamphleting was not only an 
inexpensive means of communication for those without access to the 
mass media, but it had particular persuasive power—the physical 
presence of the pamphleteer forced audiences to confront the message.  
In a series of decisions involving challenges to local anti-pamphleting 
ordinances,370 the Court stated that the First Amendment protects the use 
of public streets and parks for the distribution of pamphlets, and that 
freedom of the press extended to pamphlets and leaflets.  The press 
“comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion.”371  Pamphleting, Justice Black observed in 
Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, was essential to “the poorly financed 
causes of little people”372—“the pamphlet, an historic weapon against 
oppression, is today the convenient vehicle of those with limited 
resources because newspaper space and radio time are expensive and the 
cost of establishing such enterprises great.”373 
The public forum not only invites a clash of opinion but sometimes 
a clash of tempers.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, from 1940, struck down the 
conviction under a breach of peace statute of a Jehovah’s Witness who 
stood on the sidewalk and played records to passers-by.374  The listeners 
were outraged almost to the point of violence.  Recognizing the 
importance of confrontational in-person communication to the 
Witnesses, who pursued their project of conversion through face-to-face 
contact, the majority noted that despite the hostile audience reaction, 
Cantwell had a right to be on the public street and a “right peacefully to 
impart his views to others.”375  Similarly, the 1949 case Terminiello v. 
Chicago invalidated the conviction of a racist street-corner speaker 
 
 369. Dissenting in a 1941 case before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that had upheld a 
license tax on the distribution of pamphlets, future Justice Wiley Rutledge, appointed to the 
Supreme Court in 1943, argued that the tax “b[ore] most heavily on persons least able to afford it 
and most in need of avenues of free communication . . . who do not have the money to buy radio 
time and newspaper space.”  Busey v. D.C., 129 F.2d. 24, 37 (1941) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  The 
license tax “closes their only avenue to public attention.”  Id. 
 370. See William A. Elias, Jr., The Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases, 16 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 140 
(1948). 
 371. The press “comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information 
and opinion.”  Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1939). 
 372. 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
 373. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 619 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 374. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 375. Id. at 308. 
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under a statute that prohibited public speech that created unrest.376  The 
majority opinion noted that face-to-face speech was more likely to 
“create dissatisfaction” or even “stir[] people to anger” than messages 
communicated through radio or newspapers.377  But a major purpose of 
freedom of speech was to invite impassioned dispute, Justice Douglas 
wrote.378  However, in some situations, the Court suggested, the visceral 
and confrontational nature of in-person communication made it 
incompatible with discursive aims of the public forum.379 
Beginning with Thornhill v. Alabama in 1941,380 a series of cases 
granted peaceful labor picketing the status of First Amendment protected 
speech, overturning the earlier position that picketing, thought to be an 
inherently violent activity, was a form of “conduct” rather than 
speech.381  The Court’s movement in this direction was spurred, in part, 
by the Norris La Guardia Act of 1932,382 along with the subsequent 
“little Norris La Guardia Acts” passed by states, which had described 
labor picketing as conduct, but sanctioned it when it was used for a 
lawful purpose in a labor dispute.383  In a 1937 case, Senn v. Tile Layers’ 
Protective Union, the Court, upholding Wisconsin’s little Norris 
LaGuardia law, first referred to picketing as a form of speech, not 
conduct.384  It did so, in part, by characterizing picketing as the laborer’s 
equivalent of newspaper advertisements.  “In declaring such picketing 
 
 376. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
 377. Id. at 4. 
 378. Id.  “It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest.”  Id. 
 379. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942).  In Chaplinsky, the majority 
upheld a conviction of a public speaker under a state law that prohibited “face-to-face words plainly 
likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee.” Id. at 573.  The majority noted that certain 
kinds of hostile in-person speech, when they are directed at a person with the intent to provoke a 
fight, can be so powerful as to constitute incitement to action.  Id. at 571-72.  Chaplinsky is the only 
case in which the Court has invoked the fighting words principle.  See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting 
Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH U. L. Q. 531 (1980). 
 380. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1941). 
 381. See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (finding First Amendment 
protects peaceful picketing disentangled from violence).  After 1937, the Court increasingly sided 
with unions, a major part of the New Deal coalition.  The labor movement also reconceptualized its 
struggle, in part, as a quest for free expression—the right “to organize, strike, meet and picket.”  See 
Geoffrey D. Berman, A New Deal for Free Speech:  Free Speech and the Labor Movement in the 
1930s, 80 VA. L. REV. 291, 302 (1994) (quoting the ACLU). 
 382. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1932). 
 383. Ken I. Kersch, How Conduct Became Speech and Speech Became Conduct:  A Political 
Development Case Study in Labor Law and the Freedom of Speech, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 255 
(2002). 
 384. Senn v. Tile Layers’ Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937). 
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permissible,” Justice Brandeis had written, “Wisconsin has put this 
means of publicity on . . . par with advertisements in the press.”385 
But in a series of cases in the 1940s, the Court whittled down 
Thornhill’s broad protection for picketing, designating picketing as 
“speech plus”—speech enmeshed with threatening or violent physical 
conduct.386  The conduct elements were not First Amendment 
“speech.”387  Labor lawyers questioned why the dissemination of facts 
about a labor dispute on a sign carried by a picket might considered to be 
conduct, when the same words would be seen as relatively harmless if 
they appeared in pamphlets, in newspapers, or were broadcast over the 
radio.388  “If [a] union can constitutionally state its message on the radio, 
in a newspaper advertisement, in a leaflet, or by mail, why may it not 
constitutionally use a placard for the same purpose, and carry that 
placard wherever citizens may lawfully be?”389  The ability to persuade 
audiences was the key to good advertising and good journalism; there 
was thus “no distinction between picketing and other means of [the] 
dissemination of information.”390 
Yet the Court never reverted back to its earlier position that labor 
picketing was unprotected by freedom of speech.  This may have been 
spurred, in part, by the Court’s awareness of the anti-labor bias of the 
major media outlets.  The CIO leaders in Jersey City had tried to go on 
the radio, but they were banned from the networks.391  The union was 
only able to purchase time on a low-power New York station run by the 
 
 385. Id. at 479. 
 386. The Court did not indicate clear standards for separating speech from conduct but 
suggested that picketing was more likely to be classified as conduct when it was “enmeshed with 
contemporaneously violent conduct” or imminently likely to persuade viewers to commit violence.  
Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1941).  As 
Frankfurter wrote in the majority opinion in Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753, “utterance in a 
context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument 
of force.”  Id. at 293. 
 387. As Justice Douglas noted in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl (1941), picketing by an organized group was more 
like conduct than speech, since “the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or 
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.”  315 U.S. 769, 
776 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring).  In such a case, “the effect may cease to be persuasion and 
become intimidation and incitement to violence.”  Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131, 138 (1957).  
See Louis L. Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court’s Picketing Doctrine, 41 MICH. L. REV. 1037 
(1942). 
 388. Brief of Nat’l Lawyers Guild at 5, Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am. v. Ritter’s Café, 
315 U.S. 722 (1942) (No. 527), 1942 WL 53602 at *5. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Brief of Cong. Indus. Org. at 6, Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am. v. Ritter’s Café, 315 
U.S. 722 (1942) (No. 527), 1941 WL 52808 at *6. 
 391. Nathan Godfried, WCFL, CHICAGO’S VOICE OF LABOR 1926-78 197 (1997). 
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Socialist party.392  As Frankfurter had observed, picketing was the 
“working man’s means of communication.”393  Douglas and Black had 
noted the importance of labor’s access to public spaces for picketing in 
light of the prohibitively “great[] expense” necessary for unions to reach 
“the public over the radio or through the newspapers.”394  Picketing was 
workers’ sole means of “tell[ing] their side of the story” to the people.395  
C. The Public Forum Principle  
The right to the public forum was, of course, an exceedingly limited 
means of promoting the expression of disempowered groups.  It applied 
only to public property and therefore only to traditional means of 
communication.  There was no “First Amendment easement” to private 
property.  In 1946, the Court made one important exception in Marsh v. 
Alabama, in which it assimilated private property to the status of public 
property when it served a public function.396  In Marsh, the Court held 
that an Alabama anti-trespass statute that prohibited distributing 
literature on sidewalks could not be used to prevent the distribution of 
religious pamphlets on the sidewalks of a company town, even though 
they were privately owned.  The sidewalks served a public function 
because they were the only venues in the town that could serve as public 
forums for communication.  “Whether a corporation or a municipality 
owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical 
interest in the functioning of the community in such [a] manner that the 
channels of communication remain free,” Justice Black wrote.397  But 
Marsh did not extend to the privately-owned communications media, 
leaving disadvantaged speakers without access to the most effective 
forms of communication. 
It has been said that the public forum doctrine reflected the Court’s 
insensitivity to the problem of citizens “getting ideas before a forum.”398  
Poor and unpopular speakers unable to access the media were relegated 
to the least useful forms of communication.  Even in the 1940s, 
pamphlets and pickets “were as efficacious in a world flooded by the 
 
 392. Id. 
 393. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 293 
(1941).   
 394. Carpenters and Joiners Union of Am. Local No. 213 v. Ritter’s Café, 315 U.S. 722, 732 
(1942) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 395. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753, 312 U.S. at 320 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 396. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).  
 397. Id. at 507. 
 398. See Barron, supra note 3, at 1652. 
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communications of mass media as a blacksmith’s forge in an era of mass 
industrialization,” J.M. Balkin has written.399  Indeed, the members of 
the Court were undoubtedly aware that these traditional modes of 
communication could not compete with the media for a public audience.  
The “right to the streets” as a way of democratizing communication was 
in a sense rhetorical and aspirational.  Nonetheless, the public forum 
doctrine represented an initial acknowledgement of the ways that 
economic inequalities became speech inequalities in the media age, 
reinforcing the exclusion and disempowerment of marginalized groups.  
It suggested a new recognition of the conflict between mass 
communications and the ideal of public discussion. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
At a moment of profound and dislocating social transformation, 
Americans in the 1930s and 1940s tried to reconcile their dependence on 
mass communications with the media’s threat to public discourse.  They 
attempted to contain a powerful force that was seen as both hostile to the 
modern social order and yet absolutely essential to it.  “Public forums” 
on the radio and in newspapers would help restore possibilities for 
democratic discussion that the mass media had impaired.  The physical 
public forum, by providing a “soapbox for the poor,” would reinvigorate 
the tradition of face-to-face public debate in the town square.  The public 
forum movement advocated new visions of the role and responsibility of 
the state in creating the conditions for public discourse and the meaning 
of democratic communication in the mass media age. 
In the postwar era, the link between lack of access to the media and 
the need for a “First Amendment easement” to public places was still 
salient for members of the Supreme Court.  Yet this connection came up 
most often in dissents, signaling the Court’s retreat from its earlier, 
broad view of the public forum.  In 1965, in his dissent in Adderley v. 
Florida, involving arrests for civil rights protests in front of a jailhouse, 
Justice Douglas reiterated the necessity of the public forum for “[t]hose 
who do not control television and radio, those who cannot afford to 
advertise in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets.”400  In his 
dissent in the 1972 case Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, which overturned a 1968 
decision that had suggested possible public forum status for shopping 
malls, Justice Marshall observed that, 
 
 399. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:  Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L. J. 375, 405 (1990). 
 400. 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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For many persons who do not have easy access to television, radio, the 
major newspapers, and the other forms of mass media, the only way 
they can express themselves to a broad range of citizens on issues of 
general public concern is to picket, or to handbill, or to utilize other 
free or relatively inexpensive means of communication.  The only hope 
that these people have to be able to communicate effectively is to be 
permitted to speak in those areas in which most of their fellow citizens 
can be found.401 
In the dispersed, suburban nation that the United States had become 
by that time, the shopping center was the public forum. 
The 1970s marked the beginning of the end of the public forum, as 
the public forum doctrine crystallized into a complex set of rules that 
granted the government substantial authority to control the expressive 
uses of its own property and to declare sites off limits for public 
speech.402  Outside of “traditional” public forums, such as streets and 
parks, whether or not government property can be classified as a public 
forum depends on government intent.  Speech can be banned in sites the 
government deems “nonpublic.”  The earlier view of a state obligation to 
provide citizens with minimum communication opportunities was 
replaced by a strict rule of equal access that allowed flat bans on access 
to the forum as long as it was done evenhandedly.403 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the increasing judicial hostility to a 
broad definition of the public forum, suburbanization and the demise of 
urban public places, the civil rights movement’s problems accessing the 
media, and public outcry over racial biases in media presentation, 
spurred a renewed media reform movement.  This effort, largely 
identified with the work of law professor Jerome Barron, was in many 
ways the continuation of the efforts of the 1930s and 1940s.  In a famous 
article in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Barron, referencing the 
struggles of the civil rights protesters, argued that “the interests of those 
 
 401. 407 U.S. 551, 580-81 (1972).  In the 1968 case, Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 
v. Logan Valley Plaza, involving labor picketers’ right to access a privately owned shopping mall, 
the Court applied the minimum access requirements of the traditional public forum because the 
shopping center, in a suburbanized nation, was the functional equivalent of the streets and sidewalks 
of a municipal business district.  391 U.S. 308 (1968).  “The largescale movement of this country’s 
population from the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied by the advent of the suburban 
shopping center.” Id. at 324-25. 
 402. On the transformation of the public forum doctrine in the 1970s and after, see G. Sidney 
Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 949 (1991); Richard B. 
Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1991); David S. Day, 
The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA. L. REV. 143 (1992). 
 403. See BeVier, supra note 2; see also Sheila M. Cahill, Note, The Public Forum:  Minimum 
Access, Equal Access and the First Amendment, 28 STAN L. REV 117 (1975). 
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who control the means of communication must be accommodated with 
the interests of those who seek a forum in which to express their point of 
view.”404  Barron proposed a judicial remedy granting individuals and 
groups who wanted to voice their opinions on public affairs a right of 
nondiscriminatory access to the community newspaper, and a federal 
right of access statute, on the theory that newspapers assumed a quasi-
public function.405  Barron had been encouraged by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Red Lion Broadcasting case of 1969, which upheld the 
constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine under a scarcity theory.406  In 
the radio context, freedom of speech protected not only the rights of 
speakers, but also the interests of listeners in hearing diverse points of 
view.407  In a sequence of events reminiscent of twenty-five years earlier, 
Barron tried to use the Red Lion rationale to defend a challenged 
newspaper right of reply law.408  He was defeated in Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.409  While state-managed “public forums” in 
radio were consistent with the First Amendment, the Court held, 
freedom of the press did not permit government encroachment on 
editors’ prerogative to control the content of their papers.410 
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the public interest 
requirements in broadcasting that had equated public service with 
ideological diversity and balance were also progressively dismantled.  In 
1972, the Court upheld an FCC ruling that stated that a broadcaster 
could implement a flat ban on paid public service advertisements 
without running afoul of the fairness doctrine.411  Justice Brennan’s 
observation—that “the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to 
operate in an effective forum—whether it be a public park, a 
schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television 
frequency”412—did not command the sympathy of a majority.  During 
the 1980s, sweeping deregulatory efforts at the FCC led to the 
elimination of many of the public interest broadcast requirements 
 
 404. Barron, supra note 3, at 1656. 
 405. Id. at 1666-69. 
 406. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
 407. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).  “It is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”  Id. at 390. 
 408. Barron, supra note 3, at 1667-77. 
 409. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 410. Id. at 258. 
 411. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. 94. 
 412. Id. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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articulated in the 1940s.413  Academic commentators’ efforts to 
implement stronger public interest standards have been unavailing.414  
An ongoing media reform movement continues to attack the 
corporatization and concentrated ownership of the mass media and 
maintains that the lack of public access to the means of communication 
is the single greatest threat to freedom of speech and participatory 
democracy.415  This critique has been complicated by the advent of the 
internet.  This is not the place to engage with the many arguments that 
have been made about whether and how the internet can be 
democratized and made into an authentic public forum.416  It is to 
suggest, however, that the question may be as pressing for us as it was 
for the American people in the first communications revolution.  As 
Balkin summarizes, digital media make “possible widespread cultural 
participation and interaction that previously could not have existed on 
the same scale.  At the same time, . . . [they] create[] new opportunities 
for limiting and controlling those forms of cultural participation and 
interaction.”417  The internet provides potentially the “greatest forum for 
communication and expression the world has ever seen,” but it is subject 
to the control of a handful of “dominant, private” industries that are 
under no duty to facilitate communication and expression.418  The ideal 
described by the Hutchins Commission—a community bound together 
by equal participation in discussion and the exchange of ideas—may be 
more distant than it was when the Commission wrote.419  The public 
forum campaigns of the 1930s and 1940s, however flawed and 
incomplete they may have been, can provide a touchstone for our own 
efforts to democratize speech in a world where communication is 
everywhere but meaningful public discussion arguably remains elusive. 
 
 413. See generally Varona, supra note 136. 
 414. See Varona, supra note 136, at 159-61. 
 415. See, e.g., Robert W. McChesney, Freedom of the Press for Whom? The Question to Be 
Answered in Our Critical Juncture, 35 HOFSTRA L. R. 1435 (2007). 
 416. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 
58 Ohio St. L.J. 1535 (1998); Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace:  Making Space for Public 
Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV J.L.& TECH. 149 (1998).  Sunstein proposes the 
creation of “deliberative domains” on the internet, sites devoted to facilitating the exchange of 
ideas.  See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 14. 
 417. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:  A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV 1, 3 (2004). 
 418. DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM:  NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE 
INTERNET AGE xiii (2009). 
 419. See generally THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104. 
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